Too Much of a Good Thing

The Proactive Response Dilemma

Bibliographic Data

ID6285117
AuthorsB Peter Rosendorff (0000-0002-6775-8911, University of Southern California), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, University of Southern California), Todd Sandler
Year2004
Volume48
Issue5
Pages657-671
Publication date2004-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002704268278
OpenAlexW3126072477
LanguageEN
Citations received92
References cited10

In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event—normal or spectacular. Unlike previous analyses, proactive policy has a downside by increasing grievances and, consequently, terrorist recruitment. If the government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by providing a larger constituency. Aggressive antiterrorist actions, encouraged by a high perceived loss from terrorism and low marginal proactive costs, may result in spectacular events with dire consequences. If spectaculars are transferred abroad to soft targets, then proactive operations may be excessive from a global viewpoint as external costs are ignored. The analysis explains why some target nations engage in a modest level of offense but a prime target chooses a large level

Business · Economics · Event (particle physics · Government (linguistics · Political science · Public economics · Public relations · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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