Counterterrorism

A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Bibliographic Data

ID6285323
AuthorsDaniel G Arce M (Rhodes College), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, University of Southern California)
Year2005
Volume49
Issue2
Pages183-200
Publication date2005-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002704272863
OpenAlexW2197519133
LanguageEN
Citations received67
References cited15

This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all potential targets and are usually undersupplied, whereas defensive policies tend to yield a strong share of provider-specific benefits and are often oversupplied. When terrorists direct a disproportionate number of attacks at one government, its reliance on defensive measures can disappear. Ironically, terrorists can assist governments in addressing coordination dilemmas associated with some antiterrorist policies by targeting some countries more often than others

Business · Counter terrorism · Deterrence theory · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political science · Preemption · Public economics · Public policy · Public relations · Terrorism · Yield (engineering · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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