A Vintage Model of Terrorist Organizations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071579 |
|---|---|
| Authors | João Ricardo Faria (MPA Program, University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, USA), Jo Ão Ricardo Faria (0000-0001-6484-3566, The University of Texas at El Paso), Daniel Arce (0000-0003-1702-4570, Economics Program, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 629-650 |
| Publication date | 2012-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712438349 |
| OpenAlex | W2147006340 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 34 |
A dynamic model of a terrorist organization is presented with the defining feature being that a succession of operatives is recruited at different points in time. Consequently, a government’s counterterror policy must be tailored according to the vintage structure of the terrorist group that it faces. This implies that past history of counterterror policy and attacks matter for the formulation of current and future policy. The authors present the necessary steps to formulate and solve a vintage model, and to deal with the delay differential equations that naturally arise from the vintage structure. The resulting analysis captures the implications of a diverse set of phenomena such as Internet recruiting, training delays for logistically complex plots, age distribution of operatives, and the sensitivity of government impatience/cabinet composition to terrorist events for the inner dynamics of terrorist organizations and counterterror policy. Directions for future research are also suggested
Cabinet (room · Economics · Government (linguistics · Political science · Terrorism · Vintage · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Engineering · History · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Terrorism and electoral accountability
The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism
Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework
How Terrorist Groups End
A Note on the Effectiveness of National Anti-Terrorist Policies
How al-Qaida Ends
Why Terrorism Does Not Work
A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare
Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions
Why terrorism works
Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations
Counterterrorism
On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations
Recruitment and Allegiance
Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening
The Economic Costs of Conflict
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,36 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2020 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |