Daniel G Arce M
Biographic Data
| ID | 167547 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel G Arce M |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel G M |
| FAMILY NAME | Arce |
| SIGNATURE | M D G A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alabama |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 68 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Working Well with Others: The Evolution of Teamwork and Ethics
Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all poten…
The Evolution of Heterogeneity in Biodiversity and Environmental Regimes
Biodiversity and environmental protection are examples of international public goods problems that comprise a symmetrical system of rights and obligations. Moreover, the underlying scientific, economic, and political conditions do not necessarily lead to a prisoner's dilemma. Yet from this symmetrical beginning, voluntary (Nash) equilibria often require heterogeneous actions, the resolution of which is often couched as a North-South or East-West …
The Political Economy of the Neoliberal Transition
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button
Social Norms, Inflation and Stabilization
This study presents a socio-economic game of inflation and distributive conflict where inflation is derived from, and stabilization is implemented via, social norms. We apply the `Theory of Social Situations' (Greenberg 1990) to contrast rational choice outcomes predicted by Nash equilibrium vs those derived as social norms under our normative criteria (von Neumann-Morgenstern stability). We then analyze `heterodox' stabilization policies, which …
The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation
Populismo ou endogeneidade orçamentária? Política fiscal discricionária na Argentina
Este artigo utiliza a equação de Fischer e o efeito Olivera-Tanzi para isolar a endogeneidade inflacionária existente no déficit público argentino. O resultado é uma medida discricionária da política fiscal conhecida como orçamento zero de inflação. Através dessa medida, examinamos se o déficit reflete políticas anticíclicas ou metas de consumo populista
Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma
This article introduces four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and noncooperative games. The criteria are hybrids of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations. When applied to the three-player prisoner's dilemma, these criteria illustrate that Nash and strong Nash equilibrium behavior do not rule out the possibility of unilateral defection as a social norm. We conclude…
Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all poten…
Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma
This article introduces four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and noncooperative games. The criteria are hybrids of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations. When applied to the three-player prisoner's dilemma, these criteria illustrate that Nash and strong Nash equilibrium behavior do not rule out the possibility of unilateral defection as a social norm. We conclude…
The Evolution of Heterogeneity in Biodiversity and Environmental Regimes
Biodiversity and environmental protection are examples of international public goods problems that comprise a symmetrical system of rights and obligations. Moreover, the underlying scientific, economic, and political conditions do not necessarily lead to a prisoner's dilemma. Yet from this symmetrical beginning, voluntary (Nash) equilibria often require heterogeneous actions, the resolution of which is often couched as a North-South or East-West …
Social Norms, Inflation and Stabilization
This study presents a socio-economic game of inflation and distributive conflict where inflation is derived from, and stabilization is implemented via, social norms. We apply the `Theory of Social Situations' (Greenberg 1990) to contrast rational choice outcomes predicted by Nash equilibrium vs those derived as social norms under our normative criteria (von Neumann-Morgenstern stability). We then analyze `heterodox' stabilization policies, which …
Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma
This article introduces four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and noncooperative games. The criteria are hybrids of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations. When applied to the three-player prisoner's dilemma, these criteria illustrate that Nash and strong Nash equilibrium behavior do not rule out the possibility of unilateral defection as a social norm. We conclude…
The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation
Populismo ou endogeneidade orçamentária? Política fiscal discricionária na Argentina
Este artigo utiliza a equação de Fischer e o efeito Olivera-Tanzi para isolar a endogeneidade inflacionária existente no déficit público argentino. O resultado é uma medida discricionária da política fiscal conhecida como orçamento zero de inflação. Através dessa medida, examinamos se o déficit reflete políticas anticíclicas ou metas de consumo populista
Social Norms, Inflation and Stabilization
This study presents a socio-economic game of inflation and distributive conflict where inflation is derived from, and stabilization is implemented via, social norms. We apply the `Theory of Social Situations' (Greenberg 1990) to contrast rational choice outcomes predicted by Nash equilibrium vs those derived as social norms under our normative criteria (von Neumann-Morgenstern stability). We then analyze `heterodox' stabilization policies, which …
The Political Economy of the Neoliberal Transition
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button
The Evolution of Heterogeneity in Biodiversity and Environmental Regimes
Biodiversity and environmental protection are examples of international public goods problems that comprise a symmetrical system of rights and obligations. Moreover, the underlying scientific, economic, and political conditions do not necessarily lead to a prisoner's dilemma. Yet from this symmetrical beginning, voluntary (Nash) equilibria often require heterogeneous actions, the resolution of which is often couched as a North-South or East-West …
Working Well with Others: The Evolution of Teamwork and Ethics
Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all poten…
Political science (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game theory (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works)