Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284339 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel G Arce M (University of Alabama, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 749-765 |
| Publication date | 1994-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002794038004008 |
| OpenAlex | W2283766466 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 19 |
This article introduces four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and noncooperative games. The criteria are hybrids of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations. When applied to the three-player prisoner's dilemma, these criteria illustrate that Nash and strong Nash equilibrium behavior do not rule out the possibility of unilateral defection as a social norm. We conclude with a new type of equilibrium behavior that induces coalition building and leads to social norms that rule out unilateral defection and allow for cooperation
Best response · Dilemma · Economics · Epsilon-equilibrium · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Norm (philosophy · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Social dilemma · Stability (learning theory · Superrationality · Traveler's dilemma · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics
Structural models
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Applications of graph theory to group structure
A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence
Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2007 (12) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |