The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures

A Two-stage Game

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9724583
AutoresSubhayu Bandyopadhyay (0000-0003-1626-6543, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915), Todd Sandler
Ano2011
Volume78
Fascículo311
Páginas546-564
Data de publicação2011-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00823.x
OpenAlexW3123316650
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas22
Referências citadas18

A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, emphasizing the interaction between preemptive and defensive measures taken by two commonly targeted countries. The preemptor is apt to be the high-cost defender with the greater foreign interests. A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role. The analysis identifies key factors—cost comparisons, foreign interests, targeting risks and domestic terrorism losses—that determine counterterrorism allocations. Market failures associated with preemptive and defensive measures may be jointly ameliorated by a disadvantaged defender. Nevertheless, the subgame perfect equilibrium will still be suboptimal since externalities are not fully internalized

Disadvantaged · Economic growth · Economics · Externality · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence