More Is Not Always Better

The Case of Counterterrorism Security

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10071861
AutoresPritha Dev (0000-0003-3658-5699, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad), Konrad Grabiszewski (0000-0001-7450-7857, Prince Mohammad bin Salman College, Saudi Arabia, autor correspondente)
Ano2019
Volume63
Fascículo8
Páginas1923-1938
Data de publicação2019-01-11
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002718823924
OpenAlexW2909676178
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas28

Can counterterrorism security be counterproductive? We argue that it can be when the at-risk population acts strategically. We model a two-stage game where the government first chooses the defensive security level for a public place. The second stage is a simultaneous-move game with terrorist choosing terror effort and members of the population deciding whether or not to attend the public place. Our key measure of the efficiency of the counterterrorism security is the expected number of casualties. Under very standard and general assumptions, we show that it is possible that more security leads to an increase in that number. This is because increasing security both discourages and encourages the terrorist. On the one hand, more security makes a successful terror attack less likely (discouragement). On the other hand, more security motivates more people to attend the public place which makes the attack more valuable to the terrorist (encouragement)

Business · Computer security · Government (linguistics · Key (lock · Political science · Population · Public relations · Public security · Sociology · Terrorism · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence