IDS Models of Airline Security
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284813 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Geoffrey Heal (0000-0002-2837-0025, Columbia University), Howard Kunreuther (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 201-217 |
| Publication date | 2005-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002704272833 |
| OpenAlex | W2149957757 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 14 |
This article applies an earlier analysis of interdependent security issues to a general class of problems involving discrete interdependent exposure to terrorist risks. Any agent’s incentive to adopt risk-reducing measures depends on the actions of others because of the negative externalities created by not investing in protection. Using airline security as an illustrative example, the authors show that any individual airline will be less likely to invest in security measures as more firms in the industry also fail to invest. For a wide range of parameters, both individual airline and total industry profits can be significantly improved by everyone investing in security. The article discusses the role that private trade associations as well as public-sector actions such as taxes, subsidies, and regulations can play in dealing with the negative externalities caused by interdependent security. The article concludes with suggestions for future research
Business · Economics · Externality · Incentive · Industrial organization · Interdependence · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Subsidy · Terrorism · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Supply Chain Resilience and Risk Management · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Attack and interception in networks
Applying Analytical Methods to Study Terrorism
Imagining Numbers
Cautious Defection
Precommitment in Stochastic Versus Deterministic Social Dilemmas
Dynamic Inconsistency in Counterterrorism
Simple analytics of the impact of terror generation on attacker–defender interactions
Too Much of a Good Thing
Calling the police as an interdependent security game
Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games
Counterterrorism
The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism
Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
Terrorism experiments
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,73 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |