Terrorists versus the Government
Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283631 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kevin Siqueira (0000-0003-2026-1702, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas), Todd Sandler |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 878-898 |
| Publication date | 2006-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002706293469 |
| OpenAlex | W2141916283 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 46 |
| References cited | 21 |
This article focuses on the strategic interaction between a terrorist group and a government as both vie for grassroots support. When terrorists and the government act contemporaneously, the equilibrium outcome depends on the effectiveness of the government’s countermeasures and the ability of the government to curb popular support of the terrorists through public spending. In two alternative scenarios, the authors establish that leadership may improve both adversaries’ well-being while reducing terrorism. The leader changes in the two cases, with the weaker player going first to the advantage of both players. State sponsorship and franchising of terrorists augment violence as both adversaries expend more effort. Sponsors can offset some strategic limits to violence that competition for supporters offers
Business · Competition (biology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Grassroots · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Public relations · State (computer science · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
The Conflict Resolution and Counterterrorism Dilemma
The Historical Roots of Political Violence
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
The Political Economy of Terrorism
How do Iranians and U.S. Citizens Perceive Each Other
Government protection against terrorism and crime
Deterring Rebellion
Examining the state repression‐terrorism nexus
European Union, transnational terrorism and the strategic choice of counterterrorism policies in democratic countries
Great expectations
Dynamic Inconsistency in Counterterrorism
Why Do We Know So Little About Terrorism
Can peace be purchased? A sectoral-level analysis of aid’s influence on transnational terrorism
The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror
Aid, Intervention, and Terror
Religion and terrorism
More Is Not Always Better
Effects of Defensive and Proactive Measures on Competition Between Terrorist Groups
The Long-run Effect of 9/11
Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
The friend of my enemy is my enemy
The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention
Counter-Suicide-Terrorism
A dynamic model of suicide terrorism and political mobilization
On repression and its effectiveness
When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism
Allying to Kill
The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations
Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games
Education, Income, and Support for Suicide Bombings
Rational Overreaction to Terrorism
Losing Hearts & Minds
Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians
Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments1
Killing Two Birds with One Stone? Examining the Diffusion Effect of Militant Leadership Decapitation
Regime Types and Terrorism
Domestic Terrorism
Autocracies and Terrorism
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations
Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa
The Wane of Command
Terrorism experiments
Voice and silence
Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate
Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention
Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements
Terror in the Name of God
The Financing of Terror
Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot
Power in Numbers
Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant
Political terrorism and the size of government
Too Much of a Good Thing
Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups
Sabotaging the Peace
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence
The Quality of Terror
The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies
| Unique citing works | 46 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,3 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2023 (18) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 45 |