Voice and silence
Why groups take credit for acts of terror
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916919 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron M Hoffman (0000-0002-1570-4719, Northern Illinois University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 615-626 |
| Publication date | 2010-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343310376439 |
| OpenAlex | W2125729585 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 27 |
Terrorism is designed to draw attention to particular issues and causes. Yet, the incidence of credit-taking (announcing one's responsibility for acts of terror) varies even though anonymity can undermine the clarity of the intended messages. This article offers an explanation of the variation in credit-taking that emphasizes how the competitive context in which groups operate shapes terrorists groups' need to cultivate support for their activities. Increasing numbers of terrorist organizations make it difficult for the supporters of terrorism to reward the perpetrators of particular attacks with their backing. Since such support is critical to the proper functioning of terrorist organizations, groups use claims of responsibility to distinguish themselves from those that had no hand in the violence. Consequently, variation in the probability of credit-taking fluctuates as a function of the number of active terrorist groups in a given theater of operations. This argument is contrasted with theories that suggest credit-taking is influenced by: the ideological mix of terrorist organizations; the willingness of governments to respond to terrorism using military force; state sponsorship; the depth of communal grievances; and the use of suicide attacks. The results, based on an analysis of transnational terrorism events conducted in the Israeli theater of operations between 1968 and 2004, suggest that competitive context is a consistently strong predictor of credit-taking. By implication, the results point to the utility of counter-terrorism strategies that interfere with the transmission of information between terrorist organizations and their supporters
Argument (complex analysis) · CLARITY · Commit · Computer security · Context (archaeology) · Criminology · Political science · Public relations · Silence · Sociology · State (computer science) · Terrorism · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
More Data, New Problems
Memeing and Speaking Vernacular Security on Social Media
Media effects on public displays of brutality
Dilemmas of the terrorist underworld
Reading anonymity
To instill fear or love
Signaling Resolve through Credit-claiming
Credit claims and the survival rates of terrorist organizations
Fifty Shades of Terrorist Credit-Taking
Narco-Messages
Opening Yourself Up
We have nothing to do with it
International Terrorism and the Political Survival of Leaders
Solving the Problem of Unattributed Political Violence
Women as Agents of Terror
Between paradise and prison
Terror in the Name of God
Terror in the Mind of God, Fourth Edition
Dying to Win
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot
Deadly Connections
Understanding Terror Networks
Reply to pluchinsky and rapoport comments
The terrorism puzzle
When terrorists do the talking
This Side of Peace
Taking Time Seriously
Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations
Terrorists versus the Government
Transnational Terror and Human Rights
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
The Quality of Terror
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The role of ideology in terrorists' target selection
What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
Why terrorists don't claim credit
To claim or not to claim; that is the question - Always
Armed Conflicts, 1946-2008
Fear and Trembling
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,23 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |