Incarceration, Interrogation, and Counterterror
Do (Liberal) Democratic Institutions Constrain Leviathan
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6097150 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Will H Moore (0000-0002-4572-3945, Florida State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 421-424 |
| Publication date | 2010-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | PS Political Science & Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1049-0965 • E-ISSN: 1537-5935 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1049096510000661 |
| OpenAlex | W2142396356 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 22 |
States represent a solution to an important set of economic, political, and social problems. Whether one turns to philosophers such as Hobbes or Locke or more recent work by rational institutionalists such as Douglass North, it is something of a received wisdom that powerful states play a central and vital role in fostering economic, political, and social cooperation. The other edge of that sword, of course, is that powerful states that claim a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of coercion are ideally situated to predate, using methods that include incarceration without trial and torture. The very power that makes states effective at engaging in cooperation can weaken other organizations that might deter the state from predation. While democratic theory is not necessarily focused on the question of how we might constrain a powerful state's predation, democracy is—and, more specifically, liberal democratic institutions are—widely held to be one of the most important tools at our disposal to deter predation (e.g., Staton and Reenock 2010). Democracy, of course, refers to rule by the people, and in this article, I focus on universal suffrage as the means by which those who wield state power produce rule by the people. I refer to liberal democratic institutions, by contrast, as those institutions that perform a distinct—and, one can argue, antidemocratic—function: their purpose is to distribute power among multiple state actors in an effort to address the second edge of the sword described above and limit the tyranny of majorities. This article shows how this distinction usefully assists our assessment of the Bush administration's incarceration and interrogation policies in its war on terror
Democracy · Law and economics · Liberal democracy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Suffrage · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Torture, Ethics, and Law
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
Why Do Governments Abuse Human Rights?
Democracy and police violence
Invisibiliser la torture par le droit. Une comparaison Espagne / États-Unis
Examining repressive and oppressive state violence using the Ill-Treatment and Torture data
Bad apples just for friends
Understanding and Preventing Torture
Nationalism and torture
The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention
The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law
Democracy and the Concept of Personal Integrity Rights
On repression and its effectiveness
Does Police Militarization Increase Repression
The Lesser Evil
Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?
Veto Players
The Lesser Evil
Political Action
Mobilizing for Human Rights
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
The Rule of Law
Constitutions and Commitment
The Lesser Evil Political Ethics in an Age of Terror
On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights
U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001–2009
Substitutable Protections
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
What Stops the Torture
Beyond Durkheim
Liberal Democratic Torture
State Repression and Political Order
Human Rights in a Globalizing World
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,08 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |