Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3917660 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Navin A Bapat (0000-0002-6058-3717, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 303-318 |
| Publication date | 2011-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343310394472 |
| OpenAlex | W2017648181 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 54 |
| References cited | 34 |
This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host states have little incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups. However, the model demonstrates that while military aid does not accomplish the US goal of disarming terrorists, military aid is effective at preventing host states from negotiating with terrorist organizations. The provision of military aid provides a disincentive for host states to reach a negotiated settlement with terrorist groups, and therefore prevents terrorist organizations from altering the status quo that is favorable to the USA. This suggests that while military aid may not be effective at actually disarming terrorist groups, it can be effective at keeping terrorist groups out of power. These hypotheses are tested using the Jones & Libicki (2008) data on terrorism from 1997 to 2006. The empirical results support the conclusions of the theoretical model
Computer security · Economics · Incentive · International trade · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Terrorism · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Religion, Society, and Development
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Monsters to Destroy
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
On the Question of Generosity
Foreign Military Training and Socialization
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Why Americans Support Strict Counterterrorism Measures
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The state terrorist as terrorism racketeer – the case of Egypt
War journalism on Israel/Palestine
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Delegating repression
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Elite Bargains and External Influence
Strategic aid allocation in response to terrorism
Playing dirty to survive
Foreign aid and transnational terrorism
Of terrorism and revenue
Does transnational terrorism stimulate foreign assistance
Aid accessibility
The impact of armed conflict and terrorism on foreign aid
Public Opinion and Foreign Aid Cuts in Economic Crises
Rewards versus Sanctions in International Relations
Media framing of the Intifada of the Knives
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Framing the Israel-Palestine conflict 2021
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Foreign aid and terrorist groups
Does terror increase aid
Terrorism and affinity of nations
Extending the formal state
Paying Them to Hate US
Politicization of Aiding Others
Aiding together? Europeans’ attitudes on common aid policy
The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention
Voter reaction to the government’s refusal of natural disaster assistance
Fair-Weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid
The Compellence Dilemma
Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad
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US foreign aid, interstate rivalry, and incentives for counterterrorism cooperation
The analytical study of terrorism
Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?
A Theory of Foreign Policy
How Terrorist Groups End
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The Strategies of Terrorism
Beyond bin Laden
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Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries
Duration Models for Repeated Events
Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset
Corruption and Bilateral Aid
Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents
Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions
Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on Terror
Preferences and the Democratic Peace
Rationalist explanations for war
Bargainingtheory Andinternationalconflict
Bargaining and War
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
Foreign aid and rent-seeking
On the relationship between democracy and terrorism
Terrorism and Democracy
Education, Poverty and Terrorism
Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes
Give or Take
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror
| Unique citing works | 54 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 53 |