Navin A Bapat
Biographic Data
| ID | 1418199 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Navin A Bapat |
| GIVEN NAMES | Navin A |
| FAMILY NAME | Bapat |
| SIGNATURE | BAPAT N A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6058-3717 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 28 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 695 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 12 |
Economic Sanctions and the Escalation of Terrorism
A common belief is that sanctions will deprive targets of the resources they need to engage in offensive behaviors. This suggests that sanctions on active and passive supporters of terrorism should reduce violence. This study examines the argument that sanctions can weaken state support for terrorism and reduce terrorist violence. We argue that while sanctions may deprive active or passive supporters of resources, these market imperfections may c…
Monsters to Destroy: Understanding the War on Terror
This study argues that the war on terror can be explained as an effort to cement the U.S. dollar as the world’s foremost reserve currency by expanding American control over the global energy markets. Since the 1970s, the states of OPEC agreed to denominate their oil sales in U.S. dollars in exchange for American military protection. The 9/11 attacks gave the U.S. cover to eliminate current challengers to this system while simultaneously striking …
Will Covid-19 Cause a War? Understanding the Case of the U.S. and China
This study analyzes the possibility that COVID-19 will increase the risk of a military conflict between the United States and People’s Republic of China. The mechanism is that COVID-19 weakens American economic output, which undermines the U.S. capability to project force. This enables China’s efforts to revise the status quo. Although a rapid collapse of American power due to COVID-19 would theoretically increase the likelihood of an armed confl…
Civilian self-defense militias in civil war
To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theor…
Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing
Although sanctions generate economic costs, target states may “sanctions-proof” their regime by borrowing capital from abroad. While some targets obtain interest-free capital from black knight states, others may need to borrow with interest from international credit markets. These interest rates may sometimes make borrowing cost-prohibitive, giving targets no choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the sender. However, since senders cannot obse…
Bargaining with Insurgencies in the Shadow of Infighting
Despite the long standing “no concessions” argument, scientific studies now suggest that governments can benefit from negotiating with militant insurgencies. However, despite government efforts, the leaders of insurgent movements often appear fanatical and unwilling to negotiate. This behavior presents a puzzle: If the leaders of insurgencies mobilize to create political change, and a government offers concessions, why do insurgent leaders refuse…
Withdrawn: Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns 1
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoret…
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with th…
Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict
Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, …
When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework
Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, giv…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the Ties dataset
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict
Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight te…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
Alliances between Militant Groups
Instrumentally, militant groups should seek to maximize their power against governments by forming alliances. However, studies in bargaining theory predict that alliances between militants would suffer from commitment problems. This study seeks to identify the conditions under which militant groups overcome these acute commitment problems and form alliances. Two game theory models of alliances amongst militants are presented, the first capturing …
Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups
States engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals. This gives militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups so much that sponsors cannot control them. This study develops a game theoretic model to explain why states take the risk of sponsoring militant groups. The model demonstrates that sponsorship may be a form of costly signalling that increases th…
Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy
Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent
This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host state…
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge: Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge
Journal Article A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge Get access Navin A. Bapat Navin A. Bapat The University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 3, July 2010, Pages 217–236, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00109.x Published: 01 July 2010
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
Perfect Allies? The Case of Iraq and Al Qaeda
Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, many scholars and policy makers concluded that an alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda did not exist. Yet the absence of this alliance raises a puzzle: Given their mutual interest in opposing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, why wasn't there an alliance between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden? In this essay, we develop an explanation for why Iraq and al Qaeda did not ally using previous scholarly wor…
The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns
Many scholars have examined terrorism as a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor. However, during terrorist campaigns, terrorists often seek sanctuary from target attacks by crossing into foreign host states. This action effectively transforms the conflict from a purely domestic contest into an international issue. This paper explores why terrorist organizations make the choice to internationalize conflicts by adopting a foreign host. Fur…
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq by Ahmed S. Hashim
Journal Article Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq by Ahmed S. Hashim Get access Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraqby Ahmed S. Hashim. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2006. 322 pp. $29.95. Navin A. Bapat Navin A. Bapat Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 122, Issue 2, Summer 2007, Pages 344–345, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538…
State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups
Several policymakers argue against negotiating with transnational terrorists because of the inability of terrorist groups to form credible commitments. To succeed in negotiation, terrorists must convince target governments that they are credible bargaining partners. This paper explores how constraints from host states affect the ability of terrorists to form credible commitments. If facing sufficient threats, host states may have an incentive to …
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the Ties dataset
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups
States engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals. This gives militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups so much that sponsors cannot control them. This study develops a game theoretic model to explain why states take the risk of sponsoring militant groups. The model demonstrates that sponsorship may be a form of costly signalling that increases th…
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Alliances between Militant Groups
Instrumentally, militant groups should seek to maximize their power against governments by forming alliances. However, studies in bargaining theory predict that alliances between militants would suffer from commitment problems. This study seeks to identify the conditions under which militant groups overcome these acute commitment problems and form alliances. Two game theory models of alliances amongst militants are presented, the first capturing …
When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework
Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, giv…
Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes
One of the most striking features of insurgency is how infrequently the two sides attempt peaceful negotiation. Very often, the government refuses to grant the insurgents legitimacy as a bargaining partner. Yet, some conflicts do reach a point at which the two sides open negotiation. This article seeks to develop an explanation of the timing of negotiation during insurgency. Using a game theoretic model, this article concludes that for negotiatio…
State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups
Several policymakers argue against negotiating with transnational terrorists because of the inability of terrorist groups to form credible commitments. To succeed in negotiation, terrorists must convince target governments that they are credible bargaining partners. This paper explores how constraints from host states affect the ability of terrorists to form credible commitments. If facing sufficient threats, host states may have an incentive to …
The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns
Many scholars have examined terrorism as a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor. However, during terrorist campaigns, terrorists often seek sanctuary from target attacks by crossing into foreign host states. This action effectively transforms the conflict from a purely domestic contest into an international issue. This paper explores why terrorist organizations make the choice to internationalize conflicts by adopting a foreign host. Fur…
Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion1
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent
This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host state…
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoret…
Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict
Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, …
Civilian self-defense militias in civil war
To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theor…
The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict
Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight te…
Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing
Although sanctions generate economic costs, target states may “sanctions-proof” their regime by borrowing capital from abroad. While some targets obtain interest-free capital from black knight states, others may need to borrow with interest from international credit markets. These interest rates may sometimes make borrowing cost-prohibitive, giving targets no choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the sender. However, since senders cannot obse…
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with th…
Bargaining with Insurgencies in the Shadow of Infighting
Despite the long standing “no concessions” argument, scientific studies now suggest that governments can benefit from negotiating with militant insurgencies. However, despite government efforts, the leaders of insurgent movements often appear fanatical and unwilling to negotiate. This behavior presents a puzzle: If the leaders of insurgencies mobilize to create political change, and a government offers concessions, why do insurgent leaders refuse…
Perfect Allies? The Case of Iraq and Al Qaeda
Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, many scholars and policy makers concluded that an alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda did not exist. Yet the absence of this alliance raises a puzzle: Given their mutual interest in opposing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, why wasn't there an alliance between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden? In this essay, we develop an explanation for why Iraq and al Qaeda did not ally using previous scholarly wor…
Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge: Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge
Journal Article A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge Get access Navin A. Bapat Navin A. Bapat The University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 3, July 2010, Pages 217–236, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00109.x Published: 01 July 2010
Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion1
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security
Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security, Frank P. Harvey, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. x, 345.Following the second Gulf War, international observers were quick to criticize the unilateral behaviour of the United States. Without a UN mandate, the allies had undermined the very institution they had created to foster multilateralism following the Second World War. Yet, Frank Harvey makes th…
Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes
One of the most striking features of insurgency is how infrequently the two sides attempt peaceful negotiation. Very often, the government refuses to grant the insurgents legitimacy as a bargaining partner. Yet, some conflicts do reach a point at which the two sides open negotiation. This article seeks to develop an explanation of the timing of negotiation during insurgency. Using a game theoretic model, this article concludes that for negotiatio…
State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups
Several policymakers argue against negotiating with transnational terrorists because of the inability of terrorist groups to form credible commitments. To succeed in negotiation, terrorists must convince target governments that they are credible bargaining partners. This paper explores how constraints from host states affect the ability of terrorists to form credible commitments. If facing sufficient threats, host states may have an incentive to …
Perfect Allies? The Case of Iraq and Al Qaeda
Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, many scholars and policy makers concluded that an alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda did not exist. Yet the absence of this alliance raises a puzzle: Given their mutual interest in opposing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, why wasn't there an alliance between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden? In this essay, we develop an explanation for why Iraq and al Qaeda did not ally using previous scholarly wor…
The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns
Many scholars have examined terrorism as a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor. However, during terrorist campaigns, terrorists often seek sanctuary from target attacks by crossing into foreign host states. This action effectively transforms the conflict from a purely domestic contest into an international issue. This paper explores why terrorist organizations make the choice to internationalize conflicts by adopting a foreign host. Fur…
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq by Ahmed S. Hashim
Journal Article Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq by Ahmed S. Hashim Get access Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraqby Ahmed S. Hashim. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2006. 322 pp. $29.95. Navin A. Bapat Navin A. Bapat Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 122, Issue 2, Summer 2007, Pages 344–345, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538…
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge: Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge
Journal Article A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge Get access Navin A. Bapat Navin A. Bapat The University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 3, July 2010, Pages 217–236, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00109.x Published: 01 July 2010
Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy
Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent
This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host state…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
Alliances between Militant Groups
Instrumentally, militant groups should seek to maximize their power against governments by forming alliances. However, studies in bargaining theory predict that alliances between militants would suffer from commitment problems. This study seeks to identify the conditions under which militant groups overcome these acute commitment problems and form alliances. Two game theory models of alliances amongst militants are presented, the first capturing …
Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups
States engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals. This gives militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups so much that sponsors cannot control them. This study develops a game theoretic model to explain why states take the risk of sponsoring militant groups. The model demonstrates that sponsorship may be a form of costly signalling that increases th…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the Ties dataset
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict
Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight te…
When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework
Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, giv…
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoret…
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with th…
Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict
Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, …
Bargaining with Insurgencies in the Shadow of Infighting
Despite the long standing “no concessions” argument, scientific studies now suggest that governments can benefit from negotiating with militant insurgencies. However, despite government efforts, the leaders of insurgent movements often appear fanatical and unwilling to negotiate. This behavior presents a puzzle: If the leaders of insurgencies mobilize to create political change, and a government offers concessions, why do insurgent leaders refuse…
Withdrawn: Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns 1
Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing
Although sanctions generate economic costs, target states may “sanctions-proof” their regime by borrowing capital from abroad. While some targets obtain interest-free capital from black knight states, others may need to borrow with interest from international credit markets. These interest rates may sometimes make borrowing cost-prohibitive, giving targets no choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the sender. However, since senders cannot obse…
Civilian self-defense militias in civil war
To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theor…
Political science (28 works) · Law (25 works) · Law (24 works) · Economics (23 works) · Political economy (20 works) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (16 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (15 works) · Economic Sanctions and International Relations (12 works) · State (computer science (12 works) · Terrorism (12 works)