Alliances between Militant Groups
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6228559 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Navin A Bapat (0000-0002-6058-3717), Kanisha D Bond (University of Maryland, College Park) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 793-824 |
| Publication date | 2012-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123412000075 |
| OpenAlex | W2091933359 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 56 |
| References cited | 50 |
Instrumentally, militant groups should seek to maximize their power against governments by forming alliances. However, studies in bargaining theory predict that alliances between militants would suffer from commitment problems. This study seeks to identify the conditions under which militant groups overcome these acute commitment problems and form alliances. Two game theory models of alliances amongst militants are presented, the first capturing bilateral co-operation, and the second under conditions of asymmetry. It may be concluded that while militants less susceptible to government repression should prefer bilateral alliances, vulnerable militants are more likely to form asymmetric alliances involving state sponsors. Following the theoretical predictions, the theory is tested empirically using the UCDP/PRIO data
Bargaining power · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics · Militant · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · State (computer science · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence
Monsters to Destroy
From Ideology to Goals
A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups
Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity
How Armed Groups Survive in Failed States
Borderland Battles
The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks
Bargaining with Insurgencies in the Shadow of Infighting
A Winning Team of Losers
Delegation, Sponsorship, and Autonomy
Nation-Building and the Role of Identity in Civil Wars
Old Wine, New Bottles
Causal Pathways of Rebel Defection from Negotiated Settlements
Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Insurgency
Non-state armed actors and contested sovereignties in internationalized civil wars
Negotiation Theory and the Intifadat
A Relational Theory of Jihadist Affiliate Behaviour
Beyond Armed Competition
The crafting of alliance cohesion among insurgents
Unique offerings
Civilian self-defense militias in civil war
Strategic rebels
Once more, with feeling
Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors
The Origins of Transnational Alliances
Wars within Wars
Command and military effectiveness in rebel and hybrid battlefield coalitions
Who Joins and Who Fights? Explaining Tacit Coalition Behavior among Civil War Actors
Thinking Outside of the Box
Perceived inequality and variability in the expression of parochial altruism
Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining
The Logic of Illicit Flows in Armed Conflict
Leadership Targeting and Militant Alliance Breakdown
Networks of Violence
External Threat, Internal Rivalry, and Alliance Formation
State-Making Lessons For International Relations Research
The Impact of Ideological Ambiguity on Terrorist Organizations
Networks of Cooperation
Rebels against Rebels
Allying to Kill
Pathways to Cooperation
Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency
Competitive Alliances and Civil War Recurrence
Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity
Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? Rebel Constituencies and Civil War Alliances
A Slippery Slope
Honor Among Thieves
Rebel Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and Civil War Outcomes in the Post-Cold War Era
Threats at Home and Abroad
Partners in Crime
Antigovernment Networks in Civil Conflicts
Civil war as a social process
On-Side fighting in civil war
Fratricide in rebel movements
Fragmentation and Cooperation in the Jihadi International (Sub)System
Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
War and Peace in International Rivalry
How Terrorist Groups End
Deadly Connections
The Rebel's Dilemma
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Eugene
Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War
Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes
Taking Time Seriously
Committing to Peace
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power
No Shelter Here
Back to the Future
Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs
To Protect and to Serve
Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset
Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict
It Takes Two
Arms Versus Alliances
Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad
Tau-b or Not Tau-b
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics
Ethnicity Matters
Sabotaging the Peace
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence
Rage Against the Machines
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Interests, power, and multilateralism
Rationalist explanations for war
The Might of the Pen
Alliances
Veto Players and Civil War Duration
The Propaganda of the Deed
Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Enforcers, Entrepreneurs, and Survivors
Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
Contracting around International Uncertainty
| Unique citing works | 56 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 55 |