Who Joins and Who Fights? Explaining Tacit Coalition Behavior among Civil War Actors
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9977057 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin C Steinwand (0000-0002-4218-0164, University of Essex), Nils W Metternich (0000-0001-8757-0409, University College London , UK) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqac077 |
| OpenAlex | W4312291299 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 63 |
Which armed organizations form coalitions despite the inherent difficulties of cooperation in civil wars? We introduce the concept of tacit coalitions, which pertains to strategic and informal coalition behavior between civil war actors to address this puzzle. Our theoretical model of coalition behavior takes in theater-wide conflict behavior to allow for predictions that coalitions are more likely to form. It provides novel insights into the way military synergies within potential coalitions affect the trade-off between pooling resources and worrying about the division of gains. The empirical section finds considerable support for our theoretical argument that actors are more likely to engage in tacit coalition behavior (1) if potential coalitions are power balanced, (2) if joint capability of potential coalitions is not too high, and (3) when coalitions can unlock synergies. In addition, it produces evidence for the important role of geography and ethnic ties in generating military synergies
Argument (complex analysis · Economic system · Economics · Joins · Knowledge management · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Pooling · Positive economics · Power (physics · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Tacit knowledge · Computer Science · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
The Balance of Power
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars
Conflict and Distribution
How Is Power Shared in Africa?
Rebel Power
Sudan
Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors
Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars
Wars within Wars
The analytics of continuing conflict
Training, Morale and Modern War
Theory of international politics
Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
Uncertainty, Cleavages, and Ethnic Coalitions
Competition, Differentiation, and the Severity of Terrorist Attacks
Networks of Violence
Competing for the Crown
(Mis)Using Dyadic Data to Analyze Multilateral Events
A Plague of Initials
Networks of Cooperation
Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building
Rebels against Rebels
Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict
The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations
It Takes Two
All Alliances Are Multilateral
Recruitment and Allegiance
Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes
The Grass Is Always Greener? Armed Group Side Switching in Civil Wars
Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow
Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity
Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? Rebel Constituencies and Civil War Alliances
Exiting the Coalition
One Dyadic Peace Leads to Another? Conflict Systems, Terminations, and Net Reduction in Fighting Groups
Rebels at the Gates
Roving Bandits? The Geographical Evolution of African Armed Conflicts
Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars
Alliances and Asymmetry
Antigovernment Networks in Civil Conflicts
Born Weak, Growing Strong
Alliances between Militant Groups
Rebel movements and proxy warfare
Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence
Fratricide in rebel movements
Palestinian Suicide Bombing
Ethnicity and civil war
Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict
E pluribus unum, ex uno plures
Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede
Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War
An Analytic and Empirical Examination of Zero-Inflated and Hurdle Poisson Specifications
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |