Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6274604 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barbara J Phillips (0000-0002-9812-4030, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, corresponding author), Brian J Phillips (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 336-347 |
| Publication date | 2014-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/isqu.12073 |
| OpenAlex | W3126144894 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 53 |
| References cited | 59 |
Why do some terrorist groups survive considerably longer than others? The literature is just beginning to address this important question in a systematic manner. Additionally, and as with most studies of terrorism, longevity studies have ignored the possibility of interactions between terrorist groups. This article attempts to address these two gaps in the literature: the incomplete understanding of terrorist group survival and the tendency to assume that terrorist groups act independently. In spite of risks associated with cooperation, I argue that it should help involved terrorist groups mitigate mobilization concerns. More importantly, the impact of cooperation is conditioned by attributes of the country in which a terrorist group operates. Using new global data on terrorist groups between 1987 and 2005, I show that cooperation has the strongest effect on longevity in states where groups should have a harder time operating—more capable states and less democratic states. Interestingly, a group's number of relationships is more important than to whom the group is connected
Criminology · Democracy · Development economics · Economics · Group (periodic table · Longevity · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · Gerontology
Do Non-State Armed Groups Influence Each Other in Attack Timing and Frequency? Generating, Analyzing, and Comparing Empirical Data and Simulation
The North Caucasus
Do 90 Percent of Terrorist Groups Last Less than a Year? Updating the Conventional Wisdom
Dogs and Cats Living Together? Explaining the Crime-Terror Nexus
Monsters to Destroy
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups
Power Distribution in the Networks of Terrorist Groups
Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity
How do the factors determining terrorist groups’ longevity differ from those affecting their success
Michael D. Ward (1948–2021) and the road to space, networks and geography
What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan
An empirical analysis of alternative ways that terrorist groups end
Marked Targets
The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks
Predictors of successful terrorism incidents
Fighting for survival
Unite against the parasites’
Why do some terrorist campaigns escalate to civil wars but others do not
Understanding the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
Rethinking Intersections of Crime and Terrorism
A Relational Theory of Jihadist Affiliate Behaviour
Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances
The trials and travails of the Islamic State in Pakistan
Organizational context matters
Media effects
Protestors, terrorists or something else? How to think about dissident groups
Strategic rebels
Once more, with feeling
The old terrorism
Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors
Too central to fail? Terror networks and leadership decapitation
Evaluating the impact of repeated leadership targeting on militant group durability
Command and military effectiveness in rebel and hybrid battlefield coalitions
Are Resident Terrorist Groups Productive in Weak States
Effects of Defensive and Proactive Measures on Competition Between Terrorist Groups
Who Joins and Who Fights? Explaining Tacit Coalition Behavior among Civil War Actors
When militant organizations lose militarily but win politically
Leadership Targeting and Militant Alliance Breakdown
The Impact of Ideological Ambiguity on Terrorist Organizations
Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency
Do Failed or Weak States Favor Resident Terrorist Groups’ Survival
Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians
Needs or Symbols? The Logic of United Nations Counterterrorism Treaty Ratification
Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? Rebel Constituencies and Civil War Alliances
Enemies in the Shadows
Honor Among Thieves
Networks of Conflict and Cooperation
How the Public Defines Terrorism
Enemies with benefits? Violent rivalry and terrorist group longevity
Dying for survival
The logic of transnational outbidding
Trained to rebel
From mobilization to revolution
Social Network Analysis
An introduction to ROC analysis
Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics
The New Cold War
The Political Economy of Terrorism
How Terrorist Groups End
Terrorism and the Liberal State
Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations
Deadly Connections
Understanding Terror Networks
The Rebel's Dilemma
The Logic of Collective Action
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Event History Modeling
Some unique properties of eigenvector centrality
Centrality and network flow
All Struggles Must End
Connections Can Be Toxic
Draining the Swamp
How al-Qaida Ends
Terrorist group survival
The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism
Terrorist networks, support, and delegation
Al-Qaeda's Franchising Strategy
Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification
Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks
Taking Time Seriously
The Nature of the Beast
Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity
Comparing GEE and Robust Standard Errors for Conditionally Dependent Data
Allying to Kill
Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure
Does Democracy Matter
On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations
Predicting Conflict in Space and Time
Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes
Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks
Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents
Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes
Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms
A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups
Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations
Turning to Terror
Domestic Terrorism
Alliances between Militant Groups
Researching Democracy and Terrorism
Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
On the relationship between democracy and terrorism
Does democracy encourage terrorism
How terrorism declines
Measuring state capacity
The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks
Power and Centrality
| Unique citing works | 53 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,42 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 49 |