Do Failed or Weak States Favor Resident Terrorist Groups’ Survival
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285050 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Khusrav Gaibulloev (0000-0002-9014-9532, American University of Sharjah), James A Piazza (0000-0002-6557-0894, Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, School of Economic, Political & Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 823-848 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027231183939 |
| OpenAlex | W4380624353 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 48 |
Employing two alternative measures of state failure, we investigate how state weakness influences resident terrorist groups’ survival. Theoretically, state failure favors resident terrorist groups’ survival, while state territorial control fosters resident groups’ termination until some control threshold. Empirically, we uncover a robust negative relationship between a country’s weakness and its control of terrorism through the lens of the resident terrorist groups’ survival prospects. The discovered relationship withstands a host of robustness tests – e.g., alternative estimates and samples. We apply an instrument designed to address endogeneity concerns. In particular, our novel instrument for failed states consists of the interaction between natural disasters and ethnic fractionalization. As a state’s percentage of territorial control increases, resident terrorist groups are more prone to ending until some threshold control percent. Our analysis can guide counterterrorism policy by exploiting the nuanced theoretical determinants identified here that foster resident groups’ termination in failing states
Biology · Control (management · Criminology · Demographic economics · Development economics · Econometrics · Economics · Endogeneity · Ethnic group · Fractionalization · Political economy · Political science · Robustness (evolution · State (computer science · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete‐Time Duration Models
Geography and Economic Development
Fractionalization
How do the factors determining terrorist groups’ longevity differ from those affecting their success
Weak Links
The Political Economy of Terrorism
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror
Climate shocks and political violence
Development, discrimination, and domestic terrorism
Draining the Swamp”
From Tremors to Talks
Challenging the State
Why Target the “Good Guys”? The Determinants of Terrorism Against NGOs
Do terrorist networks need a home
Discrete-Time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories
Terrorist group survival
An empirical analysis of alternative ways that terrorist groups end
Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism
Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict
Repression Hurts
State Failure and Transnational Terrorism
Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008)
On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations
The Political Economy of ``Natural'' Disasters
Incubators of Terror
International Military Interventions and Transnational Terrorist Backlash
Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity
Regime Types and Terrorism
Enemies with benefits? Violent rivalry and terrorist group longevity
Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism
The Class Conflict Rises When You Turn up the Heat
Don't blame the weather! Climate-related natural disasters and civil conflict
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Domestic versus transnational terrorism
Failed States in a World of Terror
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |