The Grass Is Always Greener? Armed Group Side Switching in Civil Wars
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283620 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stacy Otto (0000-0002-5866-3101, Uppsala University, corresponding author), Sabine Otto |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1459-1488 |
| Publication date | 2018-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002717693047 |
| OpenAlex | W2604089705 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
| References cited | 57 |
Why do armed groups switch sides during civil wars? Most theories of conflict assume that armed groups have a fixed alignment with the government throughout their entire life span, ignoring the fact that armed groups switch between fighting on behalf of and against the government. In this article, I propose a theoretical framework that integrates armed groups’ willingness to switch sides and their capacity to do so. Armed groups are motivated to switch sides if it contributes to maintaining or improving organizational objectives. I therefore expect armed groups to switch sides as the number of other armed groups with the same alignment increases and when the state is weak. I also argue that armed groups require the capacity to switch sides in order to overcome the internal coordination problem. I propose that non-state armed actors that are the product of prior splintering are more homogeneous and cohesive than other groups. Hence, they are in a better position to attempt to switch sides. I test the propositions using a novel data set, the History of Armed Actors Dataset, containing data on when and where armed groups have switched sides during civil wars between 1989 and 2007. The results reveal that both incentives and capacity influence side switching
Algorithm · Armed conflict · Civil society · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Set (abstract data type · Spanish Civil War · State (computer science · Computer Science · Finance · Gender, Security, and Conflict · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance
Death, Dominance, and State-Building
Mobilization and Conflict in Multiethnic States
Conceptualizing Civil War Complexity
A Motion of No Confidence
Capturing group alignments
The emergence of splinter factions in intrastate conflict
Sahelistan? Military Intervention and Patronage Politics in Afghanistan and Mali
Sole Representatives in War and Peace
The Positional Problem in civil wars
When armed groups refuse to carry out election violence
Why rebels rely on terrorists
A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers
Incumbent Responses to Armed Groups in Nigeria and Kenya
Rebel Group Substitutes and Peace Agreement Amnesties
Spoiling the Broth? The Impact of Militia Violence on Peace Negotiations
Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence
Who Joins and Who Fights? Explaining Tacit Coalition Behavior among Civil War Actors
Civilian militia formation and protection against rebel violence
Violent Resistance
Progovernment militias, identity leadership, and ethnic defection
Rivalry, insurgency, and pro-government militias in authoritarian states
Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War
Voting for Militants
Disaggregating Defection
Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War
What Matters Is Who Supports You
Battles and Bargains
The Puzzle of Militia Containment in Civil War
On-Side fighting in civil war
From bad to worse? How protest can foster armed conflict in autocracies
Trained to rebel
Conflict negotiations and rebel leader selection
The root causes of Sudan's civil wars
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars
The War Machines
Interaction terms in logit and probit models
States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence
The Logic of Collective Action
The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend … The Dynamics of Self-Defense Forces in Irregular War
Terrorist Factions
In Harm's Way
Institutional Pressures and Organizational Capacity
Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation
Non-state actors in civil wars
The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations
Coup-proofing
The Strategies of Terrorism
The Structure of Success
Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars
Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes
Taking Time Seriously
Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War
Back to the Future
The Ontology of “Political Violence
Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
Militias in Civil Wars
Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building
Rebels against Rebels
Militias, Ideology, and the State
Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East
Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes
Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow
Civilianizing Civil Conflict
Leadership in social dilemmas
The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence
The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars
Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis
Ethnic Defection in Civil War
Militias in internal warfare
Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity
Palestinian Suicide Bombing
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
Measuring state capacity
How and when armed conflicts end
Masters of their domains
Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome
Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
The Essence of Military Group Cohesion
| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,57 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 32 |