Spoiling the Broth? The Impact of Militia Violence on Peace Negotiations

Bibliographic Data

ID10071714
AuthorsBarış Arı (0000-0003-1300-8880, University of East Anglia, corresponding author), Luke Abbs (0000-0001-7339-7852, University of Essex), Phillip Nelson (0000-0002-5711-4987, Independent researcher)
Year2025
Publication date2025-08-29
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027251366585
OpenAlexW4413839912
LanguageEN
References cited68

Political militias are active in most civil wars, yet their impact on peace processes is largely overlooked. Building on principal-agent logic, we argue that the incentives to delegate violence to political militias have downstream consequences for the likelihood of peace negotiations. On one hand, battlefield violence by militias can complicate the bargaining. On the other hand, the higher use of civilian victimization by political militias may backfire, eventually bringing international pressure on the unwilling parties to agree to talks. We combine data on peace negotiations between government-rebel dyads with data on militia activities in Africa. We find that militia violence against government and rebel forces is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of negotiations. When militias target civilians, however, mediated peace talks with third-party involvement become more likely. We complement these findings using fine-grained data in a focused case analysis of Sudan and South Sudan

Battlefield · Delegate · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Unrest · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access