Economic Sanctions and the Escalation of Terrorism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13020281 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Navin A Bapat (0000-0002-6058-3717, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author), Menevis Cilizoglu (0000-0002-3003-8515, St. Olaf College) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Global Security Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2057-3189 • E-ISSN: 2057-3189 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jogss/ogad016 |
| OpenAlex | W4386980217 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 39 |
A common belief is that sanctions will deprive targets of the resources they need to engage in offensive behaviors. This suggests that sanctions on active and passive supporters of terrorism should reduce violence. This study examines the argument that sanctions can weaken state support for terrorism and reduce terrorist violence. We argue that while sanctions may deprive active or passive supporters of resources, these market imperfections may create commitment problems by weakening these states’ ability to maintain the balance of power with their rivals. As a result, state supporters and their terrorists may escalate violence to solidify gains against their rivals. We test this hypothesis quantitatively using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions and the Global Terrorism datasets, and qualitatively using an examination of Pakistani support for the Haqqani Network
Argument (complex analysis · Criminology · Economic sanctions · Economics · Law and economics · Offensive · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Sanctions · State (computer science · Terrorism · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · Law
The Correlates of War (Cow) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0
Imposing Sanctions
Understanding, and Misunderstanding, State Sponsorship of Terrorism
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Success of economic sanctions threats
Terrorism and democratic states
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness
Delegating Terror
The Escalation of Terrorism
Debt or Alive
The Effect of Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia
How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Games Rivals Play
Terrorism in the Context of Civil War
Do sanction types affect the duration of economic sanctions? The case of foreign aid
The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations
Double Take
Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism
Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents
The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Don't Bite the Hand that Feeds
Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946-20011
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics
Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War
Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations
Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions
Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups
When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework
Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict
Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War
Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |