Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6228768 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel G Arce, Daniel Arce (0000-0003-1702-4570, The University of Texas at Dallas), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, The University of Texas at Dallas), Todd Sandler |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 573-586 |
| Publication date | 2007-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123407000324 |
| OpenAlex | W2074100289 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
This article presents a model of terrorist attacks as signals where the government is uncertain as to whether it is facing a group that is politically motivated or militant. Pooling equilibriums result with two types of ex post regret: P-regret, where the government concedes to political types that would not subsequently attack; and M-regret, where the government does not concede to militant types that subsequently attack at greater levels. Avoidance of such regret defines a measure of the value of intelligence. Counter-terrorism policy can then be characterized in terms of whether a government should focus on increased intelligence versus increased security (hardening targets). The recommended use of asset freezing is also evaluated in terms of the resources required by terrorists to achieve the various equilibriums. Finally, this article supports the empirical finding of intertemporal substitution of resources by terrorists, concerned with the level of government response to their attacks
Asset (computer security · Computer security · Economics · Government (linguistics · Militant · Political science · Politics · Pooling · Regret · Terrorism · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling
Ideology Isn't Everything
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Assessing Public Attitudes toward Random versus Symbolic Terrorist Targets
Research Note
Cyclicality in non-state violence
Applying Analytical Methods to Study Terrorism
European Union, transnational terrorism and the strategic choice of counterterrorism policies in democratic countries
Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy
Economic Decoupling as a Readiness Signaling Device
National Responses to Transnational Terrorism
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Transnational Terrorism
Terrorist Spectaculars
Terrorism and Policy
The Propaganda of the Deed
The Wane of Command
Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,95 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |