Economic Decoupling as a Readiness Signaling Device
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071744 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Damien Besancenot (0000-0001-6575-2332, Université Paris Cité), Radu Vranceanu (0000-0003-2050-8269, École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-02-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027261426878 |
| OpenAlex | W7131786487 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 58 |
This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of economic decoupling as a deterrence mechanism amid the renewed risk of international conflict between two economically integrated superpowers. In our model, a potential aggressor considers initiating military conflict, while the defender, anticipating this risk, can preemptively decouple to signal its readiness to resist aggression. We examine both a full-information game and a more realistic setting with incomplete information about the defender’s priorities. Under full information, we identify the optimal degree of decoupling that ensures effective deterrence. With incomplete information, deterrence becomes more fragile: although a peace equilibrium remains possible within a narrower parameter range, hybrid equilibria, where conflict occurs with positive probability, also emerge. The results highlight how even minor informational imperfections can generate intrinsic geopolitical instability, emphasizing the fragility of peace under conditions of economic interdependence
Complete information · Decoupling (probability · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Fragility · Game theory · Geopolitics · Signaling game · Game Theory and Applications · Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Military Defense Systems Analysis
In the Shadow of Power
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
The Return to Protectionism
Silver Signals
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
The economic costs of supply chain decoupling
Make Trade Not War
Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War
The Strategy and Technology of Conflict
The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence
Deterrence
Job Market Signaling
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Conflict and Trade
Peace through Trade or Free Trade
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining
The Classical Liberals Were Right
Rationalist explanations for war
How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game
Investing in the Peace
Information, Uncertainty, and War
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
Horsemen and the empty city
Economic Interdependence
Domestic Opposition and Foreign War
The Power to Hurt
Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |