US foreign aid, interstate rivalry, and incentives for counterterrorism cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916376 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Boutton (0000-0003-2293-2514, University of Central Florida, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 741-754 |
| Publication date | 2014-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314543144 |
| OpenAlex | W2136300627 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 42 |
A common strategy pursued by states targeted by international terrorism is to provide economic and military assistance to the states that host this activity. This is thought to increase their willingness and capacity to crack down on terrorism, but very little work to date has looked at whether this strategy actually leads to desirable outcomes. This article offers an explanation for why a strategy of foreign aid-for-counterterrorism can be successful in some contexts, but counterproductive in situations in which recipients have more pressing strategic priorities. Specifically, I argue that host states receiving US foreign aid that are involved in an ongoing interstate rivalry will use the aid to arm against their rival, rather than to undertake counterterrorism. These states thus have an incentive not to disarm terrorist groups, but rather to play-up the threat from terrorism in order to continue receiving aid concessions. Using data on US foreign aid and terrorist activity in recipient countries, I employ a series of duration and count models to demonstrate that, while US foreign aid can help to decrease terrorist activity in non-rivalrous states, the opposite is true in states with at least one rival
Business · Computer security · Development economics · Economics · Environmental health · Foreign policy · Incentive · International trade · Market economy · Microeconomics · Poison control · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Rivalry · Terrorism · Work (physics) · Computer Science · Engineering · International Development and Aid · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Religion, Society, and Development
Voting in the UN General Assembly
Militarising Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia
What kind of ‘world order’? An artificial neural networks approach to intensive data mining
Organized Criminal-Terrorist Groups in the Sahel
The Persistence of Global Terrorism
Why and how do terrorism-sponsoring states weaponise their complicity through controlled confession? The case of Pakistan
Fighting for survival
Societal perceptions of counterterrorism in Cameroon
Foreign aid and transnational terrorism
Of terrorism and revenue
US aid and substitution of human rights violations
The impact of armed conflict and terrorism on foreign aid
Only Friends Can Betray You
Dehumanization
Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions
When Does Security Cooperation Increase Foreign Aid Allocation
Small footprint, small payoff
Aid, Intervention, and Terror
External Subsidies and Lasting Peace
Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad
A theory of social programs, legitimacy, and citizen cooperation with the state
Dangerous lessons
Pakistan
Terrorism and U.S. foreign policy
Paradigms and Sand Castles
The Samaritan's Dilemma
Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change
A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid
Does Aid for Education Educate Children? Evidence from Panel Data
Unintended Consequences
Two-stage residual inclusion estimation
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data
How Terrorist Groups End
Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility
US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation
The warrior state
Can peace be purchased? A sectoral-level analysis of aid’s influence on transnational terrorism
The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror
The Elusive Quest for Growth
Journal of Peace Research
Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science
Games Rivals Play
Understanding Arms Race Onset
Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments
Back to the Future
Fair-Weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid
Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism
Tyrants and Terrorism
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics
Enduring Rivalries
Take the Money and Run
A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups
Conditioning the Effects of Aid
The Effects of the International Security Environment on National Military Expenditures
Autocracies and Terrorism
Briefing
Armed conflict, 1946-2010
Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011
Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent
The New Rivalry Dataset
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |