Bargainingtheory Andinternationalconflict
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232809 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Powell (0000-0003-2768-0555, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author), Robert M Powell (0000-0001-7449-2499, University of California, Berkeley) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-30 |
| Publication date | 2002-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138 |
| OpenAlex | W2165933393 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 156 |
| References cited | 82 |
International relations theory has long seen the origins, conduct, and termination of war as a bargaining process. Recent formal work on these issues draws very heavily on Rubinstein's (1982) seminal analysis of the bargaining problem and the research that flowed from it. There is now what might be called a standard or canonical model of the origins of war that sees this outcome as a bargaining breakdown. This essay reviews this standard model and current efforts to extend it to the areas of (a) multilateral bargaining, which is at the heart of old issues such as balancing and bandwagoning as well as newer ones such as the role of third-party mediation; (b) the effects of domestic politics on international outcomes; (c) efforts to explicitly model intra-war bargaining; and (d) dynamic commitment problems
Economics · International trade · Law and economics · Mediation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence
Mutually Hurting or Mutually Beneficial Stalemates? Alternative Logics Shaping Conflict Outcomes
Institutions on the Edge
American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century
Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice
The 2022 Ethiopia’s first-ever national dialogue formation
The effectiveness in international mediation of international organizations
China’s Crisis Bargaining in the South China Sea Dispute (2010-2013)
Economic Shocks and Civil War
A Theory of Power Wars
Winning Hearts and Minds through Development? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Principles of Conflict Economics
Reputation and Civil War
International Negotiation
Vengeful Citizens, Violent States
On the Historical Roots of Interstate Conflicts
The Alliance Dilemma and the Onset of War. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Two Dismal Sciences Are Better Than One—Economics and the Study of National Security
Crisis frames in the public discourse of the Municipality of Budapest after the Covid-19 pandemic
Do International Organizations Reduce the Risk of Crisis Recurrence
Does Military Experience Really Matter? An Empirical Examination of Decision Framing and Deterrence Decision-Making
Information, rebel organization and civil war escalation
Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective
Identity, bargaining, and third-party mediation
The logic and illogic of the security dilemma and contemporary realism
Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision Making
Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge
International Relations Theory and East Asian History
Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights
China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change
Causal Pathways of Rebel Defection from Negotiated Settlements
Uneven Power and the Pursuit of Peace
Domestic political institutions and the initiation of international conflict in East Asia
Rational Origins of Revisionist War
Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War
Algorithms at War
Dissolving Boundaries
Leanings and Dealings
Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace Processes
Great Power Competition and the Logic of Strategic Choice in UN Conflict Management
Inviting the Leviathan
Nationalism and war for territory
Oil prices and interstate conflict
Peace is in the air
The bargaining framework and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
Female fighters and the fates of rebellions
Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence
Bargaining, War, and Alliances
Considering concessions
Power changes, alliance credibility, and extended deterrence
Development programs, security, and violence reduction
Qui bono? Foreign military, economic, diplomatic interventions, and the termination of civil wars
Designing Alliances
Holding Out for Concession
Costly signaling in autocracy
Complementary mediation
The Dynamics of Mass Killings
Alternative international systems? System structure and violent conflict in nineteenth-century West Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia
Deterrence theory
Violence, coercion, and settler colonialism
Bullets for Ballots
Ending the Korean War
Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
The Perils of Profiling
The Strategies of Terrorism
Spoiling Inside and Out
Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement
What Terrorists Really Want
Weak party escalation
Politics by many other means
Políticas De Seguridad Contra El Narcotráfico
U.S. Treaty Making with American Indians
Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes
The Economic Coercion Trilemma
International Relations as a Social Science
Why Was the American Revolution a War? A Rationalist Interpretation
International Relations Theory and the Relationship across the Taiwan Strait
Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War
Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace
The Intrastate Contagion of Ethnic Civil War
Rationalist Experiments on War
War with Crazy Types
Introducing ICBe
Power and Political Institutions
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Why China's Rise Will Be Peaceful
Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations
The selection and signaling effects of third-party intervention
Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states
Logics of Violence in Criminal War
Deliberate Nuclear First Use in an Era of Asymmetry
Muddying the Waters
Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences
How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Conflict Termination
Expecting Elections
Democratic versus Authoritarian Coups
The Equifinality of War Termination
Recognition Matters
Territorial Conflict in the Digital Age
Game Theory and Economic Modelling
The Causes of War
Discord and Collaboration
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
A Theory of Political Transitions
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Power and International Relations
The Theory of Wages
Theoretical analysis of the “balance of power”
Back to the Future
International Relations
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
The Balance of Power
Politics Among Nations
Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy
CHAPTER Five Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict
The War Ledger
Back to the Future
Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War
Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939
Theory of international politics
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo
Game Theory and the Spiral Model
Stability and the Distribution of Power
The Security Dilemma Revisited
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
The Balance of Power
The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict
Political Competition and Economic Growth
Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
How a War Ends
Policy Failure and Political Survival
Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation
The Concentration of Capabilities and the Onset of War
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Contiguous Asian Dyads, 1950–1969
Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
Choosing Sides in Wars
Testing theories of alliance formation
Anarchy in international relations theory
Rationalist explanations for war
Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement
Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
Anarchy and the limits of cooperation
Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection
Deterring Intervention
Arms Races and Arms Control
Alliance Transitions and Great Power War
Bargaining and War
Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics
Do Weak States Bandwagon
On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science
Arms Races and Dispute Escalation
Politics Among Nations
Reconfiguring The Arms Race-War Debate
The State of the Discipline
Bargaining in Legislatures
Stability in Anarchic International Systems
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965
| Unique citing works | 156 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,78 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2026 (24) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 154 |