Ending the Korean War

The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace

Bibliographic Data

ID11262763
AuthorsElizabeth A Stanley (0000-0002-8500-7943, Elizabeth A. Stanley is Assistant Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University. This article is drawn from her book Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009)., corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume34
Issue1
Pages42-82
Publication date2009-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Security (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804
PublisherMIT Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.42
OpenAlexW2115788526
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited106

Bargaining models of war suggest that war ends after two sides develop an overlapping bargaining space. Domestic mechanisms—domestic governing coalitions, a state's elite foreign policy decisionmaking group, and their role in ending interstate war—are critical in explaining how, when, and why that bargaining space develops. Through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles, wars can become “stuck” and require a change in expectations to produce a war-terminating bargaining space. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents' governing coalitions. Events in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union during the Korean War illustrate the dynamics of these obstacles and the need for domestic coalition shifts in overcoming them before the conflict could be brought to an end

China · Economic system · Economics · Elite · Foreign policy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Preference · Soviet union · Space (punctuation) · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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