Body Counts and "Success" in the Vietnam and Korean Wars

Bibliographic Data

ID3481930
AuthorsScott Sigmund Gartner, Marissa Edson Myers
Year1995
Volume25
Issue3
Pages377
Publication date1995-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Interdisciplinary History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-1953 • E-ISSN: 1530-9169
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/205692
OpenAlexW2331668410
LanguageEN
Citations received27

Body Counts and Success in the Vietnam and Korean Wars Scholars analyzing the Vietnam War frequently argue that the United States Army's fixation on body counts-the number of enemy dead-played a major role in contributing to America's failure to win against a third world nation with considerably fewer military forces. These authors claim that unlike previous United States wars, such as World War II and Korea, where territory gained and lost was the Army's predominant measure of success, the reliance on body counts demonstrated that the geographical and political terrain of Vietnamcharacteristics that doomed United States efforts-was unique. We argue that the army relied on body counts not only in Vietnam; they were used as the main indicator of success for most of the Korean War. President Truman's decision to attempt to negotiate a return to the prewar status quo, and not to try to occupy North Korea, altered United States strategy. As a result of this change in strategy, the army adopted body counts as its new, dominant indicator of strategic assessment. Analyzing the reliance on body counts in Korea reveals a fundamental shift in both Army strategy and assessment that chal

Archaeology · Development economics · Economics · Geography · Political science · Vietnam War · History · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

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