Bargaining and the Nature of War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284100 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alastair Smith (0000-0002-5291-1442, New York University), Allan C Stam (Dartmouth College), Allan Stam (0000-0002-2533-9495, Dartmouth College) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 783-813 |
| Publication date | 2004-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002704268026 |
| OpenAlex | W2137091439 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 138 |
| References cited | 44 |
A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last
Armed conflict · Asymmetric warfare · Attrition · Conflict resolution · Conflict resolution research · Economics · International conflict · Law and economics · Lottery · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Spanish Civil War · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Military Defense Systems Analysis
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Painful Words
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Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War
Playing Different Games
The sources of military doctrine
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War and Punishment
Peace Time
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Agreeing to Disagree
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Essence of Decision
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Conflict management in enduring rivalries
Strategic Assessment in War
Revealing Preferences
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War, Casualties, and Public Opinion
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Negotiating the Terms of Settlement
Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations
In the Nick of Time
Rationalist explanations for war
A Bargaining Model of War and Peace
Bargaining and Fighting
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Bargaining and War
The Precarious Nature of Peace
Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War
The Inefficient Use of Power
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985
Some Present-Day Critics of Liberalism
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| Unique citing works | 138 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2025 (23) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 137 |