Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11349684 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Patrick Hummel (Google Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 288-300 |
| Publication date | 2015-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629814531517 |
| OpenAlex | W2063133143 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 16 |
I present a model in which a nation must decide whether to reveal its military capacity when the nation faces two possible adversaries. One adversary would be inclined to attack if the country has a weak military capacity, and the other adversary would be inclined to attack preemptively if the country is developing a strong military capacity. I derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium for the nation to be ambiguous about its military capacity as a function of the hawkishness of the adversaries and the accuracy of the adversaries’ national intelligence
Adversary · Ambiguity · Computer security · Economics · Function (biology · Military science · Military threat · Political economy · Political science · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Military Defense Systems Analysis
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |