Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231250 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James D Morrow (0000-0002-8657-4106, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 941 |
| Publication date | 1989-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111116 |
| OpenAlex | W2325153857 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 203 |
| References cited | 21 |
This paper presents and solves a crisis bargaining game under limited information. The sides alternate offers from three possible offers, with war and its costs starting if the target's counteroffer is rejected. The equilibrium of the model falls into four different cases. These four cases are analyzed to determine how the sides communicate through their offers and how the costs of war, initial beliefs, misperceptions, and distribution of capabilities drive the probabilities of a crisis and war. The model demonstrates a joint selection bias-misspecification problem in empirical studies of crises arising from the unobservable nature of beliefs. Several empirical studies of crisis bargaining are discussed in the light of this methodological problem, new patterns of evidence are found that support the presence of the selection problem, and their conclusions are reexamined
Complete information · Distribution (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Empirical research · Microeconomics · Selection (genetic algorithm · Statistics · Unobservable · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
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Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
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How the scope of a demand conveys resolve
Presidential Personality
Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision Making
Backfire
China's Diplomatic Leverage on North Korean Provocations
Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War
Mapping Conflict Research
The Importance of Being Earnest (in Mediation)
Searching for an Exit
Unpacking Conflict Process on the Korean Peninsula with Political and Seasonal Distribution
Learning about Learning
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Unpacking Escalation
Power, territory, and interstate conflict
Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
Taking the cue
Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict
Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence
What you don’t know can hurt you
Force and Influence in International Crises
Modeling 'Massive Retaliation
Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries
Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001
Crisis escalation
Risk preferences, uncertainty, and war
Challenging the status quo
A shape-based approach to conflict forecasting
Escalation at the outset
Power, Preferences, and Multiple Levels of Interstate Conflict
Conceptualizing Interstate Conflict
Accounting for Extra-Dyadic Sources of International Outcomes
The onset and initiation of disputes
The success and use of economic sanctions
Selection Effects and Deterrence
Paying the Piper? Implications of Social Insurance Payments for Conflict Propensity
War Initiation in a Changing World
Selection Effects and World Politics Research
Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries
Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts
Ending the Korean War
Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies
Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions
All Mortis, No Rigor
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Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
Uncertainty in crisis bargaining with multiple policy options
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Deterrence Theory Discussion
Deterrence Theory Discussion
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Dying to bankrupt
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A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome
Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances
When Capabilities Backfire
Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of Sender-Receiver Gaps
Hot Hand
Allying for Peace
Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads
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Executive Constraints and Success in International Crises
Domestic Politics and the Political Use of Military Force by the United States
Revealing Preferences
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Economics, Philosophy of History, and the “Single Dynamic” of Power Cycle Theory
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International Relations Theory and Game Theory
Knowing one’s future preferences
Crisis Initiation and Misperception
Mediation in the shadow of an audience
Power Concentration and Interstate Conflict
Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited
Enduring Rivalries
War Initiators and War Winners
The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises
Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International Conflicts
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Reputation and imperfect information
The ‘Operational Code’
Polarity, preponderance and power parity in the generation of international conflict
When Misperception Matters
Misperception and the Causes of War
Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies
The Value of Biased Information
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War
A Continuous-Outcome Expected Utility Theory of War
Influence Strategies, Success, and War
Power Parity and Lethal International Violence, 1969–1973
A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining
Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War
Deterrence and Compellence
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD
Reagan and the Russians
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
| Unique citing works | 203 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,34 |
| Citation span | 1988 - 2025 (38) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 202 |