The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4872852 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R Harrison Wagner (0000-0001-7823-2344, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 330-346 |
| Publication date | 1983-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1958919 |
| OpenAlex | W2131454051 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 64 |
| References cited | 16 |
The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma as commonly defined need not have the implications that are ascribed to it. It also argues that developing more adequate models of the general problem of enforcing agreements in a condition of anarchy will help us to understand better why international cooperation is more easily achieved in some areas than in others
Argument (complex analysis · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Prisoner's dilemma · Security Dilemma · Superrationality · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification
The Interaction Effects of Bargaining Power
Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics
Counterterrorism and International Power Relations
The Nuclear Arms Race
La théorie des régimes dans un monde globalisé
Instrumental and cordial logics of cross-border cooperation in Europe
The discourse of anarchy in IR
South Asian nuclear proliferation
First Strike Hypersonic Weapons
Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory
Norms and Values
Common property and collective action in economic development
Mutual and unilateral cooperation in arms race settings
Rational choice models and international relations research
The Review 's Evolving Relevance for U.S. Foreign Policy 1906–2006
Strategic theory
National security games
Beyond Deterrence
A Unified Analysis of International Conflict and Cooperation
U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations
Theories of international regimes
International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs
International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations
Rationality in International Relations
Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations
Toward a Reformulation of the Theory of Mutual Deterrence
Technological Innovation and Cooperation in Arms Races
Corralling the Free Rider
Great-Power Cooperation under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity
Organizational Routines and the Causes of War
Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Economy
Out of the Lab and into the Archives
A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining
Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation
The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology
Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of “Free and Fair” Trade
Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation
Arms Races and Cooperation
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy
The Game Theory of International Politics
Rationality and Deterrence
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
Institutions and the Free Rider
Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation
The Most Dangerous Game
Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations
A Measure for Crisis Instability with an Application to Space-Based Antimissile Systems
Mediation of Prisoners' Dilemma Conflicts and the Importance of the Cooperation Threshold
Reciprocity, Triangularity, and Cooperation in the Middle East, 1979-97
Network Context and the Effectiveness of International Agreements
Disciplining trade finance
Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation
The limits of international organization
Alliances, balance, and stability
Formal Models of International Institutions
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
Bargaining and Constitutional Contracts
Alliance Politics and Issue Areas
Climate security reversed
International Cooperation
Opec and the Problem of Collective Action
Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD
Reputation and Hegemonic Stability
A Spatial Model of International Conflict
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade
Conflict Among Nations
Compliance and Public Authority
Compliance and Public Authority
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
Anarchy and Social Choice
International Regimes
Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma
Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving
Deterrence and Bargaining
Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International Politics
The Geometry of the Arms Race
Some Aspects of a Decision-Making Model in Nuclear Deterrence Theory
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
| Unique citing works | 64 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,49 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2025 (43) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 64 |