R Harrison Wagner
Biographic Data
| ID | 809357 |
|---|---|
| NAME | R Harrison Wagner |
| GIVEN NAMES | R Harrison |
| FAMILY NAME | Wagner |
| SIGNATURE | WAGNER R H |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7823-2344 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 682 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1971 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 11 |
War and the State: Reply to comments
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
War and the State: A synopsis
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
War and the State: The Theory of International Politics
War and the State exposes the invalid arguments employed in the unproductive debate about Realism among international relations scholars, as well as the common fallacy of sharply distinguishing between conflict among states and conflict within them. As R. Harrison Wagner demonstrates, any understanding of international politics must be part of a more general study of the relationship between political order and organized violence everywhere--as i…
Bargaining, War, and Alliances
As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called “balancing” occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is ther…
India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War
Based on the experience of the Cold War, some scholars hoped that the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asia would promote peace between India and Pakistan. Instead, nuclear weapons made Pakistan less fearful of India's conventional military forces, and therefore help explain recent conflicts between them. Moreover, US expressions of concern about the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia may have provided an incentive to …
Bargaining and War
mains possible after war starts. n his well-known book, The Causes of War (1988), Geoffrey Blainey claimed that to understand why wars started one had to understand why they stopped. There is good reason to take this claim seriously. Nearly all wars end not because the participants are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop, and even capitulation is often the result of concessions made by the victor (Kecskemeti 1958). Thus t…
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between…
What was bipolarity
In spite of its widespread use, no one has ever stated clearly what the distinction between bipolar and multipolar systems refers to. Moreover, some common definitions of “bipolarity” imply behavior that is inconsistent with the behavior of states during the cold war. This article argues that the distinctive feature of post–World War II international politics was not that two states were more powerful than the others, as the literature on bipolar…
Deterrence Theory Discussion: Iv
deterrence; game theory; international conflict; rationality
Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory
Authors of several case studies of international conflict have claimed that the frequency with which statesmen are surprised by the way other governments respond to challenges is inconsistent with rational deterrence theory. Some have contended that the behavior of decision-makers is better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decision-makers' use of the information available t…
Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First
I use the theory of games to investigate issues about how to understand the use of nuclear counterforce strategies by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The function of the counterforce strategies I model is not to enable a state confidently to launch a nuclear attack but to convince its adversary that the probability that it might do so as a last resort is greater than zero. The models allow one to investigate rational b…
Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence
Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concess…
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
The theory of games is used to investigate several controversial issues in the literature on the balance of power. A simple model of an international system is presented as an n-person noncooperative game in extensive form, and the stability of both constant-sum and nonconstant-sum systems is examined. It is shown not only that constant-sum systems with any number of actors from two through five can be stable, but also that stability is actually …
War and Expected-Utility Theory
In his book The War Trap Bruce Bueno de Mesquita claims to offer a deductive theory of international conflict based on the assumption that foreign policy makers attempt to maximize their expected utility. The theory is subjected to a systematic empirical test that seems to provide impressive confirmation. The first part of this article examines Bueno de Mesquita's theory and argues that it cannot be derived from his assumptions. The second part e…
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma…
Deterrence and Bargaining
Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”…
Tides Among Nations. Karl W. Deutsch The Correlates of War I: Research Origins and Rationale. J. David Singer The Politics of Peril: Economics, Society, and the Prevention of War. Carl Friedrich von W…
The Decision to Divide Germany and the Origins of the Cold War
Journal Article The Decision To Divide Germany and The Origins of the Cold War Get access R. Harrison Wagner R. Harrison Wagner Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, Issue 2, June 1980, Pages 155–190, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600199 Published: 01 June 1980
On The Unification of Two-Person Bargaining Theory
Efforts to develop a deductive theory of bargaining based on the assumption of rational, self-interested behavior have produced serious disagreements among those who have approached the problem from this perspective. This paper argues that when allowance is made for important differences among types of bargaining situations, it is possible to develop a theory that is both coherent and plausible. An effort is also made to contribute to the underst…
Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy: An Exchange Analysis. David Howard Davis
United States Policy Toward Latin America. A Study in Domestic and International Politics
Bargaining and War
mains possible after war starts. n his well-known book, The Causes of War (1988), Geoffrey Blainey claimed that to understand why wars started one had to understand why they stopped. There is good reason to take this claim seriously. Nearly all wars end not because the participants are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop, and even capitulation is often the result of concessions made by the victor (Kecskemeti 1958). Thus t…
Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence
Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concess…
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma…
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between…
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
The theory of games is used to investigate several controversial issues in the literature on the balance of power. A simple model of an international system is presented as an n-person noncooperative game in extensive form, and the stability of both constant-sum and nonconstant-sum systems is examined. It is shown not only that constant-sum systems with any number of actors from two through five can be stable, but also that stability is actually …
What was bipolarity
In spite of its widespread use, no one has ever stated clearly what the distinction between bipolar and multipolar systems refers to. Moreover, some common definitions of “bipolarity” imply behavior that is inconsistent with the behavior of states during the cold war. This article argues that the distinctive feature of post–World War II international politics was not that two states were more powerful than the others, as the literature on bipolar…
Deterrence and Bargaining
Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”…
Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First
I use the theory of games to investigate issues about how to understand the use of nuclear counterforce strategies by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The function of the counterforce strategies I model is not to enable a state confidently to launch a nuclear attack but to convince its adversary that the probability that it might do so as a last resort is greater than zero. The models allow one to investigate rational b…
Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory
Authors of several case studies of international conflict have claimed that the frequency with which statesmen are surprised by the way other governments respond to challenges is inconsistent with rational deterrence theory. Some have contended that the behavior of decision-makers is better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decision-makers' use of the information available t…
War and Expected-Utility Theory
In his book The War Trap Bruce Bueno de Mesquita claims to offer a deductive theory of international conflict based on the assumption that foreign policy makers attempt to maximize their expected utility. The theory is subjected to a systematic empirical test that seems to provide impressive confirmation. The first part of this article examines Bueno de Mesquita's theory and argues that it cannot be derived from his assumptions. The second part e…
Bargaining, War, and Alliances
As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called “balancing” occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is ther…
India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War
Based on the experience of the Cold War, some scholars hoped that the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asia would promote peace between India and Pakistan. Instead, nuclear weapons made Pakistan less fearful of India's conventional military forces, and therefore help explain recent conflicts between them. Moreover, US expressions of concern about the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia may have provided an incentive to …
The Decision to Divide Germany and the Origins of the Cold War
Journal Article The Decision To Divide Germany and The Origins of the Cold War Get access R. Harrison Wagner R. Harrison Wagner Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, Issue 2, June 1980, Pages 155–190, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600199 Published: 01 June 1980
On The Unification of Two-Person Bargaining Theory
Efforts to develop a deductive theory of bargaining based on the assumption of rational, self-interested behavior have produced serious disagreements among those who have approached the problem from this perspective. This paper argues that when allowance is made for important differences among types of bargaining situations, it is possible to develop a theory that is both coherent and plausible. An effort is also made to contribute to the underst…
War and the State: A synopsis
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
United States Policy Toward Latin America. A Study in Domestic and International Politics
How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy: An Exchange Analysis. David Howard Davis
Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
On The Unification of Two-Person Bargaining Theory
Efforts to develop a deductive theory of bargaining based on the assumption of rational, self-interested behavior have produced serious disagreements among those who have approached the problem from this perspective. This paper argues that when allowance is made for important differences among types of bargaining situations, it is possible to develop a theory that is both coherent and plausible. An effort is also made to contribute to the underst…
Tides Among Nations. Karl W. Deutsch The Correlates of War I: Research Origins and Rationale. J. David Singer The Politics of Peril: Economics, Society, and the Prevention of War. Carl Friedrich von W…
The Decision to Divide Germany and the Origins of the Cold War
Journal Article The Decision To Divide Germany and The Origins of the Cold War Get access R. Harrison Wagner R. Harrison Wagner Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, Issue 2, June 1980, Pages 155–190, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600199 Published: 01 June 1980
Deterrence and Bargaining
Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”…
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma…
War and Expected-Utility Theory
In his book The War Trap Bruce Bueno de Mesquita claims to offer a deductive theory of international conflict based on the assumption that foreign policy makers attempt to maximize their expected utility. The theory is subjected to a systematic empirical test that seems to provide impressive confirmation. The first part of this article examines Bueno de Mesquita's theory and argues that it cannot be derived from his assumptions. The second part e…
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
The theory of games is used to investigate several controversial issues in the literature on the balance of power. A simple model of an international system is presented as an n-person noncooperative game in extensive form, and the stability of both constant-sum and nonconstant-sum systems is examined. It is shown not only that constant-sum systems with any number of actors from two through five can be stable, but also that stability is actually …
Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence
Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concess…
Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First
I use the theory of games to investigate issues about how to understand the use of nuclear counterforce strategies by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The function of the counterforce strategies I model is not to enable a state confidently to launch a nuclear attack but to convince its adversary that the probability that it might do so as a last resort is greater than zero. The models allow one to investigate rational b…
Deterrence Theory Discussion: Iv
deterrence; game theory; international conflict; rationality
Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory
Authors of several case studies of international conflict have claimed that the frequency with which statesmen are surprised by the way other governments respond to challenges is inconsistent with rational deterrence theory. Some have contended that the behavior of decision-makers is better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decision-makers' use of the information available t…
What was bipolarity
In spite of its widespread use, no one has ever stated clearly what the distinction between bipolar and multipolar systems refers to. Moreover, some common definitions of “bipolarity” imply behavior that is inconsistent with the behavior of states during the cold war. This article argues that the distinctive feature of post–World War II international politics was not that two states were more powerful than the others, as the literature on bipolar…
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between…
Bargaining and War
mains possible after war starts. n his well-known book, The Causes of War (1988), Geoffrey Blainey claimed that to understand why wars started one had to understand why they stopped. There is good reason to take this claim seriously. Nearly all wars end not because the participants are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop, and even capitulation is often the result of concessions made by the victor (Kecskemeti 1958). Thus t…
Bargaining, War, and Alliances
As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called “balancing” occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is ther…
India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War
Based on the experience of the Cold War, some scholars hoped that the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asia would promote peace between India and Pakistan. Instead, nuclear weapons made Pakistan less fearful of India's conventional military forces, and therefore help explain recent conflicts between them. Moreover, US expressions of concern about the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia may have provided an incentive to …
War and the State: The Theory of International Politics
War and the State exposes the invalid arguments employed in the unproductive debate about Realism among international relations scholars, as well as the common fallacy of sharply distinguishing between conflict among states and conflict within them. As R. Harrison Wagner demonstrates, any understanding of international politics must be part of a more general study of the relationship between political order and organized violence everywhere--as i…
War and the State: Reply to comments
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
War and the State: A synopsis
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Political science (19 works) · Economics (15 works) · Law (14 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (12 works) · Law (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Politics (10 works) · Law and economics (9 works) · Positive economics (7 works) · Sociology (7 works)