Rationality in International Relations
A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S.-China Case
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7424147 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Catherine C Langlois (San Francisco State University), Jean-Pierre P Langlois (San Francisco State University) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 358-390 |
| Publication date | 1996-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | World Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0043-8871 • E-ISSN: 1086-3338 |
| Publisher | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1353/wp.1996.0012 |
| OpenAlex | W2106847571 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 26 |
This paper develops a model of rational behavior that is found to be compatible with the evolution of China-U.S. relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. The authors introduce countervailing strategies that broaden our understanding of what is rational in a game-theoretic context. Countervailing behavior accommodates inertia and delay, as well as reactivity, and is shown to be involved in every equilibrium strategy. The terms of the interaction between the United States and China are identified in light of a countervailing model, and the payoff structure that supports the observed dynamic interaction is inferred. Prior to 1979, which marks the inception of Chinas open-door policy, the payoff structure found conforms to a little-known mixed-motive game, whereas the 1980s are characterized by a Prisoner's Dilemma. In the 1980s rational play involves positive reactivity on the part of each country, while prior to 1979 rational behavior on the part of the U.S. takes the form of an inverse response to Chinese initiatives, a behavior that draws its rationality from its ability to move China to a more cooperative stance despite a Deadlock-type payoff structure
China · Context (archaeology · Deadlock · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Rationality · Stochastic game · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
Are complex game models empirically relevant
An exploration of multi‐country political conflict/cooperation interdependence
Research note
Tacit Bargaining in International Relations
Engineering Cooperation
Narratives and Interaction
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
The Relationship among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei in the Post-Cold War Era
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Spurious regressions in econometrics
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cooperation under Anarchy
Arms Race and Military Expenditure Models
The evolution of cooperation
Arms Race Models
Sophisticated Reaction in the U.S.-Soviet Arms Race
U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations
Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation
Games and Metaphors
Evaluating Alternative Foreign Policy Decision-Making Models
A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for Weis Events Data
Arms Race Modeling
Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher
Great-Power Cooperation under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity
Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign Policy Behavior
Reciprocity in United States-Soviet Relations
Vector Autoregression and the Study of Politics
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry
China in World Affairs. The Foreign Policy of the PRC Since 1970
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2017 (22) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |