Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction

An Empirical Appraisal

Bibliographic Data

ID6283735
AuthorsCatherine C Langlois (Georgetown University), Jean-Pierre P Langlois (San Francisco State University)
Year1999
Volume43
Issue6
Pages818-839
Publication date1999-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002799043006007
OpenAlexW2770194040
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

The behavioral pointers of rationality discussed by Langlois and Langlois are used to scan the World Events Interaction Survey data on U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet relations for evidence of rational behavior in the interaction between states. The null hypothesis that the interaction between states is not compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium play in all cases examined is rejected: states react to each other's past moves; if deviations from equilibrium play are significant in explaining player moves, they determine positive inducement effects; and implied payoff structures reveal a need for strategic management of the relationship. With payoff structures estimated to be prisoner's dilemmas for all players, both bilateral relations begin with the widest tolerance of the other's behavioral choice and the adoption of countervailing strategies. Over time, these nations' strategic interaction evolves toward a sharpening of the bounds they envision for their relationships

China · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Null hypothesis · Political science · Positive economics · Rationality · Stochastic game · Strategic interaction · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Philosophy · Psychology

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