Catherine C Langlois
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4371109 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Catherine C Langlois |
| NOMBRES | Catherine C |
| APELLIDO | Langlois |
| FIRMA | LANGLOIS C C |
| AFILIACIONES | Georgetown University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 18 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 81 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1996 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2017 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Are complex game models empirically relevant
This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont’s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model.…
Unbalanced Policy Priorities and the Interrogation of Terror Suspects
Journal Article Unbalanced Policy Priorities and the Interrogation of Terror Suspects Get access Scott Sigmund Gartner, Scott Sigmund Gartner Pennsylvania State University Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner is Director and Professor at the Penn State School of International Affairs. His current research interests include net assessment, suicide in the military, dispute resolution, and the role of wartime information on decision making. He has published in…
Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships
I investigate the rationality of challenge and escalation when a third party, allied either to defender or challenger, is uncertain about the enemy’s power. The analysis illustrates how third-party ally power impacts general and immediate deterrence and willingness to intervene. In alliances with the defender, uncertainty about the enemy’s strength leads the third party to support the defender with a probability that decreases with the benefits t…
Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty and the Failure of Bargaining
Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. This article shows that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. …
The Escalation of Terror
Our goal in this article is to examine the strategic interaction between terror groups, hosts, and the United States in order to better understand the parameters of the interaction and the elements of a winning strategy. We adopt a game theoretic approach assuming that each player has a well defined goal and accounts for the anticipated behavior of the others to develop strategy. The game that we develop is a repeated game in which the host and t…
Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis
Does attrition behavior, defined as waiting for the other side to give in despite the costs of delay, help explain the duration of interstate wars? To answer this question we develop a war and bargaining model that integrates a dynamic progression of the war and allows the rivals to make offers at any time of their choosing while they fight. The model predicts that, in equilibrium, states choose to fight without making significant offers in the h…
Revue des revues
site ou, le cas chant, des conditions gnrales de la licence souscrite par votre tablissement
Dispute Settlement Design for Unequal Partners
When signatories of international agreements fail to comply unintentionally, sanctioning rules designed to deter intentional noncompliance are tested. To provide signatories with the best treaty value, we find that remedies in case of unilateral defection must account for the nature of the inequality between treaty partners, as well as the type of mixed motive game they are engaged in. Trigger type schemes, that rely on punishment by mutual defec…
Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence
We propose that fully informed rivals' ability to bargain on the terms of an alternative status quo can lead to the failure of asymmetric deterrence. The model we develop to support this claim allows repeated rounds of bargaining, crisis, and war until one of the rivals agrees to the other side's last offer. The defender holds and enjoys possession of the prize coveted by the challenger. We argue that the defender's incentive to drag his feet and…
Holding Out for Concession
If the terms of a potential international agreement are interpreted as sharing surpluses generated by cooperation, they can be viewed, on an item by item basis, as giving an advantage to one or the other party. By interpreting bargaining outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to the status quo, we modify Rubinstein's full information bilateral alternative offers bargaining model, and find that this opens up new bargaining tactics in equili…
When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War
Why would fully informed, rational actors fight over possession of a valued asset when they could negotiate a settlement in peace? Our explanation of the decision to fight highlights the incentives that are present when the defender holds a valued asset coveted by the challenger. The defender receives utility from possession of the contested asset and sees any compromise as a loss that is lower if postponed. The challenger, instead, sees any comp…
Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin
Most theoretical and formal arguments about rational deterrence assume that war is a game-ending move. In the asymmetric case, the logic of deterrent threats then rests on the relative merits of war and submission. Perfectly informed rivals ensure that immediate deterrence always succeeds although general deterrence may not. Does this strong result survive the repetition of the standard one-shot deterrence game? We show that an unbundling of the …
Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value
We present a game theoretic analysis of the prevention of noncompliance that deals with treaty violations whether they are intentional or not. Game theorists have developed probabilistic trigger schemes to handle such situations. We analyze dispute resolution procedures in subgame perfect trigger terms and suggest alternative designs for the handling of signatory breach. This paper shows that designs can be compared directly by evaluating their a…
Engineering Cooperation
odern international treaties are often phased agreements that specify a goal to be reached together with a time frame within which to achieve it. This is a characteristic of arms-reduction agreements, but it is also pervasive in free-trade agreements as well as treaties designed to protect the environment. Our goal in this article is to understand the rational underpinnings of such phasing. To this end, we will exhibit a class of strategies in th…
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
This study argues for a behavioral interpretation of rational choice in a changing environment that potentially restores the equilibria of discounted repeated games as useful descriptors of long-term bilateral relations between nation-states. The analysis reveals that all subgame perfect equilibrium strategies fall into one of three classes: countervailing, strongly inducive, or weakly inducive. Only strongly inducive strategies require knowledge…
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
The behavioral pointers of rationality discussed by Langlois and Langlois are used to scan the World Events Interaction Survey data on U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet relations for evidence of rational behavior in the interaction between states. The null hypothesis that the interaction between states is not compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium play in all cases examined is rejected: states react to each other's past moves; if deviations from eq…
Tacit Bargaining in International Relations
The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation. These strategies do not require one player to entertain specific expectations about the strategic choice of the other. For this reason, countervailing strat…
Rationality in International Relations
This paper develops a model of rational behavior that is found to be compatible with the evolution of China-U.S. relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. The authors introduce countervailing strategies that broaden our understanding of what is rational in a game-theoretic context. Countervailing behavior accommodates inertia and delay, as well as reactivity, and is shown to be involved in every equilibrium strategy. The terms of the inte…
Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis
Does attrition behavior, defined as waiting for the other side to give in despite the costs of delay, help explain the duration of interstate wars? To answer this question we develop a war and bargaining model that integrates a dynamic progression of the war and allows the rivals to make offers at any time of their choosing while they fight. The model predicts that, in equilibrium, states choose to fight without making significant offers in the h…
Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty and the Failure of Bargaining
Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. This article shows that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. …
When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War
Why would fully informed, rational actors fight over possession of a valued asset when they could negotiate a settlement in peace? Our explanation of the decision to fight highlights the incentives that are present when the defender holds a valued asset coveted by the challenger. The defender receives utility from possession of the contested asset and sees any compromise as a loss that is lower if postponed. The challenger, instead, sees any comp…
Rationality in International Relations
This paper develops a model of rational behavior that is found to be compatible with the evolution of China-U.S. relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. The authors introduce countervailing strategies that broaden our understanding of what is rational in a game-theoretic context. Countervailing behavior accommodates inertia and delay, as well as reactivity, and is shown to be involved in every equilibrium strategy. The terms of the inte…
Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence
We propose that fully informed rivals' ability to bargain on the terms of an alternative status quo can lead to the failure of asymmetric deterrence. The model we develop to support this claim allows repeated rounds of bargaining, crisis, and war until one of the rivals agrees to the other side's last offer. The defender holds and enjoys possession of the prize coveted by the challenger. We argue that the defender's incentive to drag his feet and…
Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin
Most theoretical and formal arguments about rational deterrence assume that war is a game-ending move. In the asymmetric case, the logic of deterrent threats then rests on the relative merits of war and submission. Perfectly informed rivals ensure that immediate deterrence always succeeds although general deterrence may not. Does this strong result survive the repetition of the standard one-shot deterrence game? We show that an unbundling of the …
Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships
I investigate the rationality of challenge and escalation when a third party, allied either to defender or challenger, is uncertain about the enemy’s power. The analysis illustrates how third-party ally power impacts general and immediate deterrence and willingness to intervene. In alliances with the defender, uncertainty about the enemy’s strength leads the third party to support the defender with a probability that decreases with the benefits t…
The Escalation of Terror
Our goal in this article is to examine the strategic interaction between terror groups, hosts, and the United States in order to better understand the parameters of the interaction and the elements of a winning strategy. We adopt a game theoretic approach assuming that each player has a well defined goal and accounts for the anticipated behavior of the others to develop strategy. The game that we develop is a repeated game in which the host and t…
Engineering Cooperation
odern international treaties are often phased agreements that specify a goal to be reached together with a time frame within which to achieve it. This is a characteristic of arms-reduction agreements, but it is also pervasive in free-trade agreements as well as treaties designed to protect the environment. Our goal in this article is to understand the rational underpinnings of such phasing. To this end, we will exhibit a class of strategies in th…
Tacit Bargaining in International Relations
The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation. These strategies do not require one player to entertain specific expectations about the strategic choice of the other. For this reason, countervailing strat…
Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value
We present a game theoretic analysis of the prevention of noncompliance that deals with treaty violations whether they are intentional or not. Game theorists have developed probabilistic trigger schemes to handle such situations. We analyze dispute resolution procedures in subgame perfect trigger terms and suggest alternative designs for the handling of signatory breach. This paper shows that designs can be compared directly by evaluating their a…
Unbalanced Policy Priorities and the Interrogation of Terror Suspects
Journal Article Unbalanced Policy Priorities and the Interrogation of Terror Suspects Get access Scott Sigmund Gartner, Scott Sigmund Gartner Pennsylvania State University Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner is Director and Professor at the Penn State School of International Affairs. His current research interests include net assessment, suicide in the military, dispute resolution, and the role of wartime information on decision making. He has published in…
Dispute Settlement Design for Unequal Partners
When signatories of international agreements fail to comply unintentionally, sanctioning rules designed to deter intentional noncompliance are tested. To provide signatories with the best treaty value, we find that remedies in case of unilateral defection must account for the nature of the inequality between treaty partners, as well as the type of mixed motive game they are engaged in. Trigger type schemes, that rely on punishment by mutual defec…
Holding Out for Concession
If the terms of a potential international agreement are interpreted as sharing surpluses generated by cooperation, they can be viewed, on an item by item basis, as giving an advantage to one or the other party. By interpreting bargaining outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to the status quo, we modify Rubinstein's full information bilateral alternative offers bargaining model, and find that this opens up new bargaining tactics in equili…
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
This study argues for a behavioral interpretation of rational choice in a changing environment that potentially restores the equilibria of discounted repeated games as useful descriptors of long-term bilateral relations between nation-states. The analysis reveals that all subgame perfect equilibrium strategies fall into one of three classes: countervailing, strongly inducive, or weakly inducive. Only strongly inducive strategies require knowledge…
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
The behavioral pointers of rationality discussed by Langlois and Langlois are used to scan the World Events Interaction Survey data on U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet relations for evidence of rational behavior in the interaction between states. The null hypothesis that the interaction between states is not compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium play in all cases examined is rejected: states react to each other's past moves; if deviations from eq…
Tacit Bargaining in International Relations
The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation. These strategies do not require one player to entertain specific expectations about the strategic choice of the other. For this reason, countervailing strat…
Rationality in International Relations
This paper develops a model of rational behavior that is found to be compatible with the evolution of China-U.S. relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. The authors introduce countervailing strategies that broaden our understanding of what is rational in a game-theoretic context. Countervailing behavior accommodates inertia and delay, as well as reactivity, and is shown to be involved in every equilibrium strategy. The terms of the inte…
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
This study argues for a behavioral interpretation of rational choice in a changing environment that potentially restores the equilibria of discounted repeated games as useful descriptors of long-term bilateral relations between nation-states. The analysis reveals that all subgame perfect equilibrium strategies fall into one of three classes: countervailing, strongly inducive, or weakly inducive. Only strongly inducive strategies require knowledge…
Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction
The behavioral pointers of rationality discussed by Langlois and Langlois are used to scan the World Events Interaction Survey data on U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet relations for evidence of rational behavior in the interaction between states. The null hypothesis that the interaction between states is not compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium play in all cases examined is rejected: states react to each other's past moves; if deviations from eq…
Engineering Cooperation
odern international treaties are often phased agreements that specify a goal to be reached together with a time frame within which to achieve it. This is a characteristic of arms-reduction agreements, but it is also pervasive in free-trade agreements as well as treaties designed to protect the environment. Our goal in this article is to understand the rational underpinnings of such phasing. To this end, we will exhibit a class of strategies in th…
Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value
We present a game theoretic analysis of the prevention of noncompliance that deals with treaty violations whether they are intentional or not. Game theorists have developed probabilistic trigger schemes to handle such situations. We analyze dispute resolution procedures in subgame perfect trigger terms and suggest alternative designs for the handling of signatory breach. This paper shows that designs can be compared directly by evaluating their a…
Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin
Most theoretical and formal arguments about rational deterrence assume that war is a game-ending move. In the asymmetric case, the logic of deterrent threats then rests on the relative merits of war and submission. Perfectly informed rivals ensure that immediate deterrence always succeeds although general deterrence may not. Does this strong result survive the repetition of the standard one-shot deterrence game? We show that an unbundling of the …
Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence
We propose that fully informed rivals' ability to bargain on the terms of an alternative status quo can lead to the failure of asymmetric deterrence. The model we develop to support this claim allows repeated rounds of bargaining, crisis, and war until one of the rivals agrees to the other side's last offer. The defender holds and enjoys possession of the prize coveted by the challenger. We argue that the defender's incentive to drag his feet and…
Holding Out for Concession
If the terms of a potential international agreement are interpreted as sharing surpluses generated by cooperation, they can be viewed, on an item by item basis, as giving an advantage to one or the other party. By interpreting bargaining outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to the status quo, we modify Rubinstein's full information bilateral alternative offers bargaining model, and find that this opens up new bargaining tactics in equili…
When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War
Why would fully informed, rational actors fight over possession of a valued asset when they could negotiate a settlement in peace? Our explanation of the decision to fight highlights the incentives that are present when the defender holds a valued asset coveted by the challenger. The defender receives utility from possession of the contested asset and sees any compromise as a loss that is lower if postponed. The challenger, instead, sees any comp…
Revue des revues
site ou, le cas chant, des conditions gnrales de la licence souscrite par votre tablissement
Dispute Settlement Design for Unequal Partners
When signatories of international agreements fail to comply unintentionally, sanctioning rules designed to deter intentional noncompliance are tested. To provide signatories with the best treaty value, we find that remedies in case of unilateral defection must account for the nature of the inequality between treaty partners, as well as the type of mixed motive game they are engaged in. Trigger type schemes, that rely on punishment by mutual defec…
Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis
Does attrition behavior, defined as waiting for the other side to give in despite the costs of delay, help explain the duration of interstate wars? To answer this question we develop a war and bargaining model that integrates a dynamic progression of the war and allows the rivals to make offers at any time of their choosing while they fight. The model predicts that, in equilibrium, states choose to fight without making significant offers in the h…
The Escalation of Terror
Our goal in this article is to examine the strategic interaction between terror groups, hosts, and the United States in order to better understand the parameters of the interaction and the elements of a winning strategy. We adopt a game theoretic approach assuming that each player has a well defined goal and accounts for the anticipated behavior of the others to develop strategy. The game that we develop is a repeated game in which the host and t…
Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships
I investigate the rationality of challenge and escalation when a third party, allied either to defender or challenger, is uncertain about the enemy’s power. The analysis illustrates how third-party ally power impacts general and immediate deterrence and willingness to intervene. In alliances with the defender, uncertainty about the enemy’s strength leads the third party to support the defender with a probability that decreases with the benefits t…
Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty and the Failure of Bargaining
Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. This article shows that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. …
Unbalanced Policy Priorities and the Interrogation of Terror Suspects
Journal Article Unbalanced Policy Priorities and the Interrogation of Terror Suspects Get access Scott Sigmund Gartner, Scott Sigmund Gartner Pennsylvania State University Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner is Director and Professor at the Penn State School of International Affairs. His current research interests include net assessment, suicide in the military, dispute resolution, and the role of wartime information on decision making. He has published in…
Are complex game models empirically relevant
This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont’s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model.…
Political science (17 obras) · Economics (16 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Law (12 obras) · Microeconomics (12 obras) · Computer Science (10 obras) · Law and economics (9 obras) · Game theory (8 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (6 obras) · Mathematical economics (5 obras)