Engineering Cooperation

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6232483
AutoresCatherine C Langlois, Jean-Pierre P Langlois
Ano2001
Volume45
Fascículo3
Páginas599
Data de publicação2001-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2669241
OpenAlexW2332532458
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas9

odern international treaties are often phased agreements that specify a goal to be reached together with a time frame within which to achieve it. This is a characteristic of arms-reduction agreements, but it is also pervasive in free-trade agreements as well as treaties designed to protect the environment. Our goal in this article is to understand the rational underpinnings of such phasing. To this end, we will exhibit a class of strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game that prescribe a gradual approach to cooperation. We will show that, in the presence of noise, these strategies promise better dynamic stability of the coop

Business · Dilemma · Economics · Frame (networking · Game theory · International trade · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Repeated game · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics