Disciplining trade finance
The OECD Export Credit Arrangement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6271908 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew M Moravcsik (0000-0003-3892-7568, Harvard University Press, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 173-205 |
| Publication date | 1989-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0020818300004598 |
| OpenAlex | W1976475365 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 25 |
| References cited | 34 |
The salience of tariffs, quotas, and other import restrictions in current discussions of trade policy obscures what may well become a more significant form of government intervention: subsidized export promotion. Over the past two decades, subsidized trade finance has been one of the most widely used instruments of export promotion. This article offers an historical description and a theoretical explanation for the success of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Export Credit Arrangement, an international regime restricting the provision of subsidized trade finance. The explanation emphasizes three factors: the structure of government institutions, the relative power of states, and the functional value of information. More generally, the analysis demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of monocausal explanations of international cooperation and the advantages of explanations based on a conception of international cooperation as a multistage, process, each stage of which may be explained by a separate theory
Business · Credit enhancement · Credit reference · Credit risk · Economics · Export credit agency · Government (linguistics · International economics · International trade · Market economy · Political science · Promotion (chess · Salience (neuroscience · Subsidy · Finance · Global trade and economics · International Development and Aid · World Trade Organization Law
The Club‐based Climate Regime and OECD Negotiations on Restricting Coal‐fired Power Export Finance
China–Japan development finance competition and the revival of mercantilism
Trade, national competitiveness and the environment‐part ii
How Rising Powers Create Governance Gaps
Arms exports, new labour and the pariah agenda
Regional and global disciplining of officially supported export credit insurance 1
Kicking away the financial ladder? German development banking under economic globalisation
Financial globalization as positive integration
The international political economy of export credit agencies and the energy transition
Managing tied aid competition
When market fundamentalism and industrial policy collide
Cascading noncompliance
State capacity, economic statecraft, and markets
We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King
China's Development Finance
Determinants of developing country debt
Negotiating the Single European Act
Preferences and Power in the European Community
Much ado about nothing? The European Union and the global politics of untying aid
Power transitions and global trade governance
Maintaining System Stability
Apples and Dragon Fruits
Democratic Convergence and Free Trade
International regimes and alliance behavior
Infrastructure finance, late development, and China’s reshaping of international credit governance
Political Order in Changing Societies
The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Liberal Protectionism
Nuclear Power Struggles
The World in Depression
International regimes
International collaboration in civil aerospace
Subsidies in International Trade
Government Support for Exports
Subsidizing Success
Nuclear Power Struggles
Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe
Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics
The irony of state strength
State Power and the Structure of International Trade
International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934
Testing theories of regime change
The limits of hegemonic stability theory
Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy
The agent-structure problem in international relations theory
Explaining the non-proliferation regime
The limitations of “structural” theories of commercial policy
Theories of international regimes
International regimes, transactions, and change
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
The Political Economy of Trade
| Unique citing works | 25 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,71 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 2023 (33) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 25 |