When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
Two-Level Games with Uncertainty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285887 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keisuke Iida (0000-0001-9087-3013, Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 403-426 |
| Publication date | 1993-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002793037003001 |
| OpenAlex | W2124857988 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 91 |
| References cited | 39 |
Recent studies of uncertainty in international relations treat nation-states as unitary actors, but it may be more realistic to suppose that uncertainty also arises from domestic decision-making processes. By formalizing Putnam's theory of two-level games, this article attempts to integrate the studies of uncertainty and the “second image.” The distinction between domestic and international asymmetric information turns out to be subtle yet important. When there is complete information and international asymmetric information, domestic constraints may or may not enhance bargaining power; but they do not make successful ratification difficult. On the other hand, when there is incomplete domestic information, successful ratification is not guaranteed although the expected payoffs of the constrained negotiators may be still greater than without domestic constraints
Complete information · Economics · Information asymmetry · International relations · International trade · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Ratification · Unitary state · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
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| Unique citing works | 91 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,84 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 91 |