Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations
Elections and Divided Government As Constraints on Trade Liberalization
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285250 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Helen V Milner (0000-0003-2990-8373, Columbia University), B Peter Rosendorff (0000-0002-6775-8911, University of Southern California) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 117-146 |
| Publication date | 1997-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002797041001006 |
| OpenAlex | W2117367444 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 113 |
| References cited | 28 |
Elections affect both the probability of successful ratification and the terms of international trade agreements; domestic politics in its simplest form shapes international negotiations. Without elections, the extent of protection in a trade agreement increases with the degree of divided government, and the Schelling conjecture—whereby an international negotiator can point to a hawkish legislature to extract greater concessions from the foreign country—holds only when the legislature is not too hawkish. An election (where the executive anticipates the preferences of the legislature imperfectly) implies that when divisions in government rise, the probability of ratification failure increases, the expected outcome becomes more protectionist, and the executive's influence vis-à-vis the foreign country declines, thus challenging the Schelling conjecture
Democracy · Divided government · Economics · Foreign policy · Government (linguistics · International economics · International trade · Legislature · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Protectionism · Ratification · Global trade and economics · International Development and Aid · Law · World Trade Organization Law
Playing the Two-level Game
Domestic Politics of Trade Policy
The IMF and Economic Development
Informal governance in world politics
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Compliance with negotiated military dispute settlement
Leadership Matters
Coopetition framework
Linkages Between Trade Facilitation and Governance
The great trilemma
Interrogating the conditions for political collaboration between the state and the medical profession
Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization
Comfort to Our Adversaries”? Partisan Ideology, Domestic Vulnerability, and Strategic Targeting
Treaty-Making and Partisan Politics
The Institutional Design of Arms Control Agreements
Cultivating Rice and Votes
The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration
How domestic political context shapes the topics in UNFCCC conference of the parties decisions, 1995–2023
The effects of treaty legality and domestic institutional hurdles on environmental treaty ratification
Signed but Not Ratified
TPP negotiations and political economy reforms in Japan’s executive policy making
Bringing the Party Back In
The political context of change in transboundary freshwater agreements
The cause of congressional oversight effort in US arms sale plans
Two-level games and trade cooperation
Declining hegemony and the sources of Trump’s disengagement from multilateral trade governance
Over the threshold
The Life and Death of International Treaties
Assessing the network power capacity of Informal International Governmental Organizations (Iigo)
Canada’s Multiple Voices Diplomacy in Climate Change Negotiations
Preference Changes in New Liberalism
Domestic and International Asymmetries in United States–European Union Trade Negotiations
The Breakdown of International Negotiations
Federalism, Paradiplomacy and Foreign Policy
A fluid divide
Delayed cooperation
Domestic politics and climate change
House Rules
Running out the digital clock
Trade vote determinants
Buying treaties with cigarettes
Protectionist Executives
Holding Out for Concession
Time for a haircut
Contenciosos brasileiros na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC)
The political economy of compulsory licensing
Uncertainty and ratification failure
Ratification of the 1992 Climate Change Convention
Strategic ratification
The Effect of Reciprocity on Trust
International Negotiations in the Shadow of Elections
Term Limits and Environmental Treaty Commitments
Divided Government and U.S.Trade Policy
Preferências domésticas e instituições do processo decisório em política econômica externa
Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation
Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union
Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union
Obstructing integration
Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively Unilateral" Trade Policy
The Tariff and the Lobbyist
In View of Ratification
Divided Government, Legislative Productivity, and Policy Change in the USA and France
From Unanimity to Consensus
How States Ration Flexibility
Seeking Domestic Approval
Trade Politics Is Local Politics
International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation
The New Political Economy of Trading and its Institutional Consequences
Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage
Bringing Parliaments Back in
International Relations Theory and Game Theory
Puzzled out? The unsurprising outcomes of the Greek bailout negotiations
What factors determine bargaining power and success in EU negotiations
International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints
Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining
Inefficient Cooperation Under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty
Picking Treaties, Picking Winners
Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
A Treasure Trove of Insights
Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but Not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences
Reactions and Reciprocity
Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization
Policy Signaling and Foreign Electoral Uncertainty
When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings
International Negotiations in the Shadow of National Elections
Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy
Delayed Ratification
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments
Patently Misleading
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
Who Is Powerful
Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy
Party Strength and International Trade
Political Parties, Foreign Policy and Ideology
Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations
Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements
Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation
The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics
Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy
Economic Models of Political Choice
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Export subsidies and international market share rivalry
Cooperation among Nations
After Hegemony
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection
The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States
Divided government and U.S. trade policy
Allies, adversaries and international trade
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions
Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation
Diplomacy and domestic politics
Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory
Divided Government
Decision Making in Political Systems
Trade and the variety of democratic institutions
The Political Economy of Federalism
| Unique citing works | 113 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,9 |
| Citation span | 1997 - 2026 (30) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 112 |