International Negotiations in the Shadow of Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071637 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Justin Melnick (0000-0001-6823-117X, New York University, New York, NY, USA), Alastair Smith (0000-0002-5291-1442, New York University, New York, NY, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 7-8 |
| Pages | 1452-1481 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027221139433 |
| OpenAlex | W4309468877 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 31 |
Within a formal model of international agreements in the shadow of renegotiations and domestic competition, we highlight three important ways elections shape international agreements. Elections determine who will be in control of policy in the future, which affects how leaders bargain today. Elections also determine the deals policymakers will agree to. Finally, proposers have the opportunity to shape the contours of domestic political competition with what is offered in pre-electoral bargaining. We identify that several canonical results in the literature – like the Schelling conjecture or the idea that hawkish leaders have an innate bargaining advantage over dovish leaders – only hold under certain restrictions on how voters evaluate their leaders. In contrast, we show paradoxically that when voters are prospective, electoral incentives shade the ability for domestic leaders to negotiate better deals for their publics. Counterintuitively, this leads to hawks agreeing to more conciliatory agreements than doves
Competition (biology · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Shadow (psychology · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Interests, Institutions, and Information
International Treaty Ratification and Leader Turnover
The shadow of the polls
What's Stopping You
A comparison of prospective and retrospective voting with heterogeneous politicians
Why only Nixon could go to China
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Involuntary defection in two-level games
The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box
Retrospective and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year Elections
International bargaining, endogenous domestic constraints, and democratic accountability
International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
Picking Treaties, Picking Winners
Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations
Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation
The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions
Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation
Politics at the Water’s Edge
Diplomacy and domestic politics
The Politics of Risking Peace
Determining Trade Policy
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
When Doves Cry
Hawks, Doves, and Peace
Incumbents, successors, and crisis bargaining
Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises
Reelection and Renegotiation
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |