Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joe Clare (0000-0003-2245-9376, Louisiana State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1311-1337 |
| Publication date | 2014-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002713498705 |
| OpenAlex | W2113287712 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 34 |
How does the hawkish or dovish nature of the domestic opposition in one state influence its own, as well as an international opponent’s, negotiating behavior? I show that doves, when negotiating in the presence of a hawkish opposition, have more bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The key is to understand an international opponent’s preference to deal with a dove rather than a hawk in future negotiations. I argue that adversaries have an incentive to concede more in negotiations to doves in order to sustain them in office, because failing to give concessions may lead to their replacement by less conciliatory (more hawkish) governments in the future. For this reason, doves are more likely than hawks to extract critical concessions from adversaries. The empirical results support this argument, which altogether suggests that doves are more successful in international negotiations not because they are more conciliatory, but rather because, for domestic reasons, they have greater bargaining leverage to extract counter-concessions from adversaries
Adversary · Dove · Economics · Incentive · International relations · International trade · Law and economics · Leverage (statistics · Market economy · Negotiation · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Statements of Resolve
Do international transparency initiatives substitute for domestic governance
Do Hawks and Doves Deliver? The Words and Deeds of Foreign Policy in Democracies
Multiple Rivals and Leadership Approval
Quantitative Approaches in Coalition Foreign Policy
Chamber of opportunities
Unpacking Conflict Process on the Korean Peninsula with Political and Seasonal Distribution
How reciprocal cooperation between international rivals shapes threat perceptions
International Negotiations in the Shadow of Elections
Move First to Avoid the Worst
Features of foreign policy birds
The cost of dehumanization
Party politics at the water’s edge
The Ratification Premium
Do Partisan Types Stop at the Water’s Edge
Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919 to 2001
Shaking Hands with the Internal Enemy
The Gendered Peace Premium
Reacting to the Olive Branch
From Foes to Friends
Hawks, Doves, and Peace
Government ideology and the implementation of civil war peace agreements
When the Stakes Are High
Mapping Policy Preferences
Standing Your Ground
The Steps to War
Strategic Choice and International Relations
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Partisan Interventions
Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections
Testing the “Dick Cheney” Hypothesis
What's Stopping You
Minority government and majority rule
Why only Nixon could go to China
Making peace with the PLO
Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies
Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976–1998
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites
Assuming the Costs of War
In the Defense of Women
Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box
Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions
Back to the Future
Ideological structure and foreign policy preferences
Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation
Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies
Ideological Fractionalization and the International Conflict Behavior of Parliamentary Democracies1
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization
The Politics of Risking Peace
Multilateralism with small and large numbers
When Doves Cry
The Precarious Nature of Peace
Governments, Partisanship, and Foreign Policy
Political Parties and Foreign Aid
| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |