Governments, Partisanship, and Foreign Policy
The Case of Dispute Duration
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916725 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael T Koch (Texas A&M University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 799-817 |
| Publication date | 2009-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343309339250 |
| OpenAlex | W2077817222 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 36 |
| References cited | 65 |
Do variations in partisanship and political outcomes among democratic states affect the duration of militarized interstate disputes? To answer this question, the author develops a model of partisan competition derived from the government failure literature. The author argues factors associated with government failure determine the ability of governments to contend with the domestic political costs of militarized disputes, specifically the duration of those disputes. The author tests his expectations using hazard analysis on a dataset of 20 democratic governments and militarized disputes between 1945 and 1992. The results suggest the outcome of party competition in the form of a government's sensitivity to the potential political costs of conflict is an important part of the conflict process. The author concludes that differences in domestic political outcomes influence the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Governments that are politically more secure in their tenure engage in longer disputes. Alternatively, governments that are more vulnerable have significantly shorter disputes. In addition, because government partisanship contributes to vulnerability, it also affects dispute duration, with governments of the left engaging in shorter disputes, while governments of the right fight longer disputes
Competition (biology) · Computer security · Democracy · Duration (music) · Economics · Foreign policy · Government (linguistics) · Outcome (game theory) · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Vulnerability (computing) · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
A Framework for Measuring Leaders' Willingness to Use Force
Were Those Decisions Righteously Made? The Chinese Tradition of Righteous War and China’s Decisions for War, 1950–1979
Do Hawks and Doves Deliver? The Words and Deeds of Foreign Policy in Democracies
The Party Politics of Foreign and Security Policy
Move First to Avoid the Worst
Populism’s Challenge to International Institutions
Peace at Home, Conflict Abroad
Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration
The Political Consequences of Terrorism
Votes and violence
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Polarisation, accountability, and interstate conflict
Competing national roles
Play the scramble, avoid the backlash? Partisan dynamics in the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties
Time is on my side? The impact of timing and dispute type on militarized conflict duration
Democratic victory and war duration
The “Most Important Problem” Dataset (Mipd)
Some Agents are Freer than Others
The populist radical right and military intervention
Peace at What Price
Third‐Party State Domestic Politics and Conflict Management During Interventions into Civil Conflicts
Nato Burden Sharing in Libya
In the Defense of Women
Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions
The politics of military assistance
Where do hawks and doves fly when shots are fired
Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation
Militarized Disputes, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
Term Limits, Leader Preferences, and Interstate Conflict
Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict
The ideational foundations of coercion
Defending the Realm
Death and Turnout
Hawks, doves, and opportunistic opposition parties
Parties to an alliance
The Decider's Dilemma
Coalitions in Parliamentary Government
The theory of political coalitions.
Making and Breaking Governments
Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998)
Electoral Systems and Party Systems
War and Punishment
Mapping Policy Preferences
After Hegemony
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Political Parties, Growth and Equality
The Correlates of War (Cow) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0
The Theory of Committees and Elections
The Logic of Political Survival
Peace and War
Political Control of the Economy
Institutions and Strategy in Parliamentary Democracy
Death of the Fourth Republic
Testing Competing Institutional Explanations of the Democratic Peace
Testing the “Dick Cheney” Hypothesis
Eugene
What's Stopping You
Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance
Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Mandates and Policy Outputs
Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict
War Expansion and War Outcome
Time to Fight
Opening Up the Black Box of War
On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes
The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation
Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts
Casualties and Constituencies
Election Cycles and War
The Declining Advantages of Democracy
Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts
In the Nick of Time
Enduring Rivalries
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
A Bargaining Model of War and Peace
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm
The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries
How Initiators End Their Wars
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties
Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration
Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, And Interstate Dispute Escalation
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies
Measuring Alliances
Interdependence and the Duration of Militarized Conflict
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios
Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986
The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985
Liberalism and World Politics
Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
| Unique citing works | 36 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,25 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 36 |