Time to Fight
Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285701 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Ireland (0000-0001-6064-3575, University of California, Davis), Michael J Ireland, Scott Sigmund Gartner (Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 547-568 |
| Publication date | 2001-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002701045005001 |
| OpenAlex | W2048571281 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 62 |
| References cited | 59 |
Democratic peace arguments make compelling claims about the importance of regime type for explaining conflict but do not explain the variation in conflict propensity among states that share a common regime type. The authors develop a veto-player approach to capture the effects of executive constraint and argue that in parliamentary democracies, cabinet structure and allies influence states' conflict behavior. A hazard analysis is used to examine the time before a government's first initiation of force in 569 cabinets in 18 countries from the end of World War I to 1990 ( N = 25,238 cabinet months). Results show that minority governments have a smaller hazard for initiating a conflict than either coalition or majority cabinets. However, the likelihood of conflict initiation for coalition and majority cabinets is the same. States with allies are less likely to initiate force. Across states of relatively uniform political culture, institutional measures of constraint effectively predict variation in conflict behavior
Cabinet (room · Constraint (computer-aided design · Democracy · Economics · Geography · Government (linguistics · International conflict · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Variation (astronomy · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Democracy, Peace, and War
Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making
Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000
Not created equal
Peace at What Price
Barriers to Peace in Civil War
Democratic Accountability and Foreign Security Policy
Peace at Home, Conflict Abroad
Contested Roles and Domestic Politics
Taking It to the Extreme
The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior in Middle Eastern Enduring Rivals, 1948-1998
The Rift
Quantitative Approaches in Coalition Foreign Policy
When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy
Coalition Cabinet Decision Making
Votes and violence
Chamber of opportunities
Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh
Party system stability and conflict initiation
EU member state participation in military operations
Testing the “Dick Cheney” Hypothesis
Trigger-happy? Military regimes and the timing of conflict
Sticking it out
A Reassessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of Analysis
Nuclear weapons and interstate conflict behavior
Some Agents are Freer than Others
Single-party government, Prime Minister psychology, and the diversionary use of force
Disaggregating Peace
What's Stopping You
Lessons in disguise
Bringing democracy back in
Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance
Making the International Local
Where are the doves? Explaining party support for military operations abroad in Italy
Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict
Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies
Immigration, government type, and social welfare spending
Did Theresa May Kill the War Powers Convention? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on UK Intervention in Syria in 2013 and 2018
Constraining or enabling? The effects of government composition on international commitments
Peace through Insecurity
Leadership Style, Decision Context, and the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making
International Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Flexibility, and Surplus Majority Coalitions in Israel
Dynamic Foreign Policy Behavior
Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations
Casualties and Constituencies
The Equifinality of War Termination
The barking dogs
Overcoming Obstacles to Peace
Ideological Fractionalization and the International Conflict Behavior of Parliamentary Democracies1
Dictators and Death
Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies
Veto players, electoral incentives and international commitments
Clarity of responsibility and foreign policy performance voting
Why Canada Goes to War
Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System
Institutions of the Offensive
Democracy and Diversion
Hawks, doves, and opportunistic opposition parties
Governments, Partisanship, and Foreign Policy
Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs
Popular vs. elite democratic structures and international peace
The Decider's Dilemma
Making and Breaking Governments
War and Punishment
The International Almanac of Electoral History
Grasping the Democratic Peace
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
War and Reason
Making Party Democracy in Greece
Political Change in Greece
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992
Political structure and foreign policy learning
Take two democracies and call me in the morning
Eugene
War, implementation costs and minimal winning coalitions
Democracy and International Conflict
Social and Cultural Dynamics
Race, Casualties, and Opinion in the Vietnam War
Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976
War Expansion and War Outcome
War, Casualties, and Public Opinion
Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes
All Politics Are Local
Double Take
Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War
Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General)
Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force
System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers
Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness
Beginners and Winners
The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989
The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
An “Events” Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection
The Process of Cabinet Dissolution
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965
Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force
Bargaining and War
The War-Weariness Hypothesis
Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration
Decision Making in Political Systems
Democracies and War Participation
War and the Survival of Political Leaders
Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, And Interstate Dispute Escalation
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies
Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986
Domestic Opposition and Foreign War
Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict
Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
War and the Fate of Regimes
Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88
Democratizing for Peace
The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes
Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965
Political Parties in New Zealand
Australian Government and Politics
| Unique citing works | 62 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,58 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2025 (24) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 62 |