Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ross A Miller (0000-0002-9376-9569, Santa Clara University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 388-402 |
| Publication date | 1999-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002799043003006 |
| OpenAlex | W1964333827 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 71 |
| References cited | 32 |
This study explores the relative propensity of democratic and autocratic regimes to engage in diversionary behavior. Although previous research has focused on the willingness of leaders to engage in conflict, recent studies suggest an alternative explanation: the effect of strategic interaction opportunities. Previous studies suggest that even though democratic leaders may have an incentive to use foreign policy to manipulate domestic audiences, would-be adversaries limit their interaction opportunities. This article extends the analysis to a comparison of the behavior of democratic and autocratic regimes. Using three different indicators of the domestic political vulnerability of leaders—economic growth rates, protests, and rebellions—the results indicate that democratic leaders are apparently more affected by strategic interaction opportunities than their autocratic counterparts
Autocracy · Democracy · Economics · Incentive · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Strategic interaction · Vulnerability (computing · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 71 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,73 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 71 |