Diverting the Legislature
Executive-Legislative Relations, the Economy, and US Uses of Force1
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6274151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David J Brulé, David Brulé (University of Tennessee at Knoxville), Wonjae Hwang (0000-0003-2378-6344, University of Tennessee at Knoxville) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 361-379 |
| Publication date | 2010-06-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00591.x |
| OpenAlex | W1893054294 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 60 |
Given distinct partisan macroeconomic preferences, the partisanship of the president or majority in Congress should influence presidential decisions to use force in the face of poor economic conditions—the diversionary use of force. But previous research posits contradictory accounts of the influence of partisanship. We seek to resolve this debate by developing a game theory model, which predicts that leaders divert when government is divided and economic conditions hurt the opposition party's constituency. Leaders seek to divert the legislature from the economy in order to prevent the legislature from passing a remedial economic bill. Analyzing US conflict behavior since World War II, we examine the conditional influence of presidential partisanship and the president's cohesive partisan support in Congress on the effects of inflation and unemployment. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that as their cohesive partisan support in Congress declines, Democratic presidents tend to use force in response to inflation and Republican presidents tend to use force in response to unemployment
Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Inflation (cosmology · Legislature · Macroeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Unemployment · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
When and How Do Presidents Terminate Sanctions? The Effect of Domestic Factors on US Sanctions Policy
Domestic Political Problems and the Uneven Contenders Paradox
France’s militarized interstate disputes
The “Most Important Problem” Dataset (Mipd)
Responsibility and the Diversionary Use of Force
Political protests and the diversionary use of media
Unemployment, central bank independence, and diversionary conflict
Diversionary Theory of War and the Case Study Design
Presidential popularity and international crises
Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force
Democratic Accountability and Diversionary Force
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
Party System Change
On Deaf Ears
Partisan Politics in the Global Economy
War and Change in World Politics
Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994
With the Stroke of a Pen
The American Political Economy
Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data
Presidents, Public Opinion, and Diversionary Behavior
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992
The Dynamics of Diversion
Threats, opportunity, and force
Eugene
The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957 1
The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957
Taking Time Seriously
Assessing the President
Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of U.S. Conflict Propensity
Agreeing to Disagree
Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950- 1992
Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary Use of Force
Are There Two Presidencies? Yes, But Only for Republicans
Understanding Interaction Models
Measuring Legislative Potential for Policy Change
Delegative Democracy
Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force
Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force
The Indirect Link
Democratic Diversions
Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes
Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation, and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990
Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force
Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts
Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses of Force
Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention
An "Invitation to Struggle"? The Use of Force Against "Legislatively Vulnerable" American Presidents
Ballotbox Diplomacy
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization
Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force
Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of Presidential Popularity
The Politics of Blame
Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force
Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad
The Two Presidencies
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
The President and the Political Use of Force
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,73 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |