Avoiding Diversionary Targets

Bibliographic Data

ID3918472
AuthorsGiacomo Chiozza (0000-0002-6046-0901, Duke University), H E Goemans (0000-0001-5240-7134, University of Rochester)
Year2004
Volume41
Issue4
Pages423-443
Publication date2004-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022343304044475
OpenAlexW2145011484
LanguageEN
Citations received53
References cited59

This article identifies three common flaws in the empirical literature on the diversionary use of force. First, while theoretical models of the diversionary use of force are built on the motivations of leaders to stay in power, the great majority of empirical studies employ datasets with the country or countryyear as their unit of analysis. Second, while theories of the diversionary use of force strongly suggest a reciprocal relationship between the probabilities of losing office and international conflict, almost no studies have explicitly modeled such a reciprocal relationship. Third, most empirical studies ignore how the diversionary incentives of leaders might affect the strategic calculus of their potential foreign opponents. This article explicitly addresses these common flaws by using a dataset with the leader-year as the unit of analysis and by employing a two-stage probit model to examine a reciprocal relationship between the probabilities of losing office and becoming a target, thus focusing on targets. The authors find only qualified support for the modified strategic theory of diversionary conflict. On the one hand, as the risk of losing office increases, leaders become less likely to be targets in an international crisis. On the other hand, however, the risk of becoming a target in an international crisis does not affect the probability of losing office

Affect (linguistics) · Econometrics · Economics · Empirical research · Environmental health · Incentive · International conflict · International law · Microeconomics · Operations research · Poison control · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Probit · Probit model · Reciprocal · Statistics · Unit (ring theory) · Use of force · Engineering · Human Factors and Ergonomics · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Mathematics · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology

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