Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231046 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nikolay Marinov (0000-0002-1870-8248, Yale University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 564-576 |
| Publication date | 2005-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Review of | Economic Sanctions: From Sanctions to Nonviolence, James Pattison, 2018 |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x |
| OpenAlex | W2045149844 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 178 |
| References cited | 50 |
Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle
Argument (complex analysis · Coercion (linguistics · Development economics · Economic sanctions · Economics · Foreign policy · International economics · Law and economics · Optimism · Panel data · Pessimism · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Sanctions · Work (physics · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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| Unique citing works | 178 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8,9 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 177 |