The Functions of Economic Sanctions
A Comparative Analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5014682 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fredrik Hoffmann (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1967 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 140-159 |
| Publication date | 1967-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336700400204 |
| OpenAlex | W2123369402 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
This article studies economic sanctions in their political context, from the point of view of the sanctioning powers. The point of departure here is the question: why does a nation in a given political situation select precisely economic sanctions and not one of the other theoretically possible modes of reaction (stretching from absolute passivity to the declaration of full war) ? The article is then based on two case studies: the decision made by the League of Nations to apply sanctions against Italy in 1935, and the decision of the British Govern ment to apply sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965. The League-decision is explained as the outcome of a set of fallacious, legalistic theories about how the international system functions. The decision of the British Government is interpreted as an 'escape' from a political cross-pressure situation. Finally, the contention is formulated that, for political reasons, the probability of successful sanctions is fairly low
Context (archaeology) · Declaration · Economic sanctions · Economics · Geography · Government (linguistics) · Law and economics · League · Point (geometry) · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · History, Medicine, and Leadership · Law · Mathematics · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy
Foreign intervention and warfare in civil wars
The failure of the Arab oil weapon in 1973–1974
Behavioralism in the Study of the United Nations
Using Positive Sanctions to End International Conflicts
Fools Suffer Gladly
Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion
Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments
When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature
The impact of human rights Ingo activities on economic sanctions
The Strategic Substitution of United States Foreign Aid
Deploying Sanctions while Protecting Human Rights
Sanctions and the Future of EU–Russian Economic Relations
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Ending Economic Coercion
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
A Simulation Model of Katouzian's Theory of Arbitrary State and Society
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
Interaction Patterns in the Middle East
The Paradox of Sanctions Regime in Sudan
A Classic Despite Its Errors? Evaluating Johan Galtung’s Seminal Sanction Study
Economic Coercion in World Politics
When Do Economic Sanctions Work
Power or Plenty
Toward a Unified Strategy for Peace Education
Sanctioning Violence
Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes
International sanctions as international punishment
International Sanctions
Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders
Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict
Ostracism and the EU’s contradictory approach to sanctions at home and abroad
Sanction Failure
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,59 |
| Citation span | 1970 - 2026 (57) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 25 |