Understanding the effect of madman leaders on economic sanctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11896000 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Meilin Li (0009-0005-9696-6524, University of North Texas, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 320-343 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629.2025.2473355 |
| OpenAlex | W4408242635 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 75 |
How does concern with reputation affect a leader’s decision on whether to comply with an economic sanction demand? There is limited scholarship unpacking the leader’s responses to sanctions. In this study, I examine how a reputation for madness affects leaders’ responses toward imposed sanctions. I argue that it is problematic and ineffective to use economic sanctions against so-called madman leaders, because they are less likely to comply with sanction demands and are more prone to maintain their reputation for madness. I evaluate my theory by examining all US, UN, or EU sanction cases from 1989 to 2012, using coarsened exact matching. The results demonstrate that madman leaders are less likely to back down when facing imposed sanctions. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of how the reputations of leaders affect sanction outcomes
Economic sanctions · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Positive economics · Sanctions · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Economic sanctions reconsidered
Punishing the Prince
Busted Sanctions
The global sanctions data base
The institutional environment for infrastructure investment
Resolve in International Politics
Regimes of the World (RoW)
Unmasking the Black Knights
How Do Target Leaders Survive Economic Sanctions? The Adverse Effect of Sanctions on Private Property and Wealth
U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China
Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions
Unpredictability as doctrine
Post-Cold War sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US
The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions
The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Coercive or Corrosive
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness
Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success
The effects of economic sanctions on targeted countries’ stock markets
Updating the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data
Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work
Institutions and Cooperation
Who Fights for Reputation
Saddam Hussein
Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security
Issue-Image Trade-Offs and the Politics of Foreign Policy
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia
Honor and War
The Power to Hurt and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions
The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression
Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions
When Do Economic Sanctions Work
The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Foreign Asset Expropriation
Successful or Counterproductive Coercion? The Effect of International Sanctions on Conflict Intensity
An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success
Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Honest Threats
Mechanisms of Morality
The Costs of Reneging
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies
Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes
Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments
Fools Suffer Gladly
Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions
A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Repression and Dissent
Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics
Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders
Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict
On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions
The Turnover Trap
Decomposing Audience Costs
Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion
Revisiting the Madman Theory
The microfoundations of economic sanctions
Sanctions and Regime Type
Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution
International sanctions before and beyond UN sanctions
Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Democratic Sanctions
Economic coercion and currency crises in target countries
Not all dictators are equal
The Domestic Sources of International Reputation
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |