Popular vs. elite democratic structures and international peace
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3915927 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Devin K Joshi (0000-0003-1531-9367, University of Denver), J S Maloy (Oklahoma State University), Timothy M Peterson (0000-0003-1159-4898, University of South Carolina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 463-477 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314567722 |
| OpenAlex | W2107125643 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 52 |
Structural theories of international peace among democratic regimes have relied on two distinct explanatory logics: democratic institutions may cause a state's foreign policy to tend toward peace by exposing policymaking elites to pressure from ordinary citizens (the popular logic) or to pressure from other governmental agencies (the elite logic). These logics are often conflated in scholarly studies of war and peace, but we attempt to isolate the popular logic for empirical testing by developing a novel measure of institutionalized popular influence, the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI). Whereas previous usage of the Polity index to operationalize democratic structures has succeeded in testing the elite logic more than the popular logic, we use the IDI to analyze long-established democracies' involvement in international conflict between 1961 and 2001. What we find are significant differences within the family of democratic regimes that point to a monadic structural explanation of peace: more popular democracies are less warlike with respect to all other regimes, not just other democracies. By capturing variance among democratic regimes in their structures of inclusion (especially formal rules pertaining to voter access, electoral formulae, and cameral structures), the IDI enables us to observe crucial differences between the conflict propensities of more popular and more elite types of democracy
Democracy · Democratization · Economic system · Economics · Elite · Epistemology · Law and economics · Operationalization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Polity · Positive economics · Sociology · State (computer science) · Variance (accounting) · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance
Full Participation
Making Votes Count
Machiavellian Democracy
Political Parties and Democracy
Interaction terms in logit and probit models
A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance
Democracy and Development
Democracies at War
The Logic of Democracy
The MID 3 data set, 1993–2001
Patterns of democracy
Driving Democracy
The Logic of Political Survival
Electing to Fight
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace? Reflections on the Realist Critique of Kant's Project
The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001
Evaluating the Monadic Democratic Peace
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
A Boom with Review
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance
Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict
Improving Tests of Theories Positing Interaction
Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy
Establishing the rules of the game
Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies
Back to the Future
Understanding Interaction Models
Time to Fight
Shared Human Rights Norms and Military Conflict
Double Take
Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War
Tau-b or Not Tau-b
Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention
Survival and Accountability
Explaining Rare Events in International Relations
The protective and developmental varieties of liberal democracy
The Calculus of Consensus Democracy
Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations
Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace
Settled Borders and Regime Type
Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies
The Dividends of Diversion
Committed To Peace
Election Laws and Representative Governments
The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace
Beyond the Separate Democratic Peace
Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986
Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2021 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |