System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283435 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Huth, D Scott Bennett, Christopher Gelpi (0000-0002-1463-9011, University of Michigan) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 478-517 |
| Publication date | 1992-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002792036003004 |
| OpenAlex | W2165152929 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 83 |
| References cited | 57 |
The authors investigate the relationship between system structure and the initiation of militarized disputes among Great Powers. The central hypotheses concern the interaction between system uncertainty and the risk propensity of national decision makers. The authors employ a research design that enables them to incorporate explanatory variables from various levels of analysis into their theoretical model. The model is tested by probit analysis on a pooled time series of Great Power rival dyads from 1816 to 1975. The empirical results support the central hypothesis that the effects of the international system are mediated by the risk propensity of decision makers. In addition, the authors find that dyadic- and unit-level variables such as arms races, power transitions, and the current and past dispute behavior of rivals also have significant effects on conflict behavior. Finally, the results indicate that nuclear weapons do not seem to have a systematic impact on the initiation of militarized disputes among Great Powers
Econometrics · Economics · Explanatory power · International conflict · Ordered probit · Political science · Positive economics · Probit · Probit model · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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Regions of War and Peace
The fog of leadership
Reputation and Civil War
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How Initiators End Their Wars
Fear and Loathing
The Magnitude of Warfare Revisited – System Polarity and War Duration
Weathering the Storm
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Status Quo Orientation, Capabilities, and Patterns of War Initiation in Dyadic Rivalries
Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict
Nuclear Weapons as Shields
How leader's type shapes the effect of nuclear latency on dispute involvement
The Correlates of War Project
Taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry
The empirical importance of enduring rivalries
The evolution of disputes
Critical Periods and Regime Type
Classical deterrence theory
Time Present and Time Past
Power, Preferences, and Multiple Levels of Interstate Conflict
Accounting for Extra-Dyadic Sources of International Outcomes
You’ve Got to Know When to Fold ‘Em
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Tau-b or Not Tau-b
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Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War
Enduring Rivalries
Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis
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Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics
Technological Change and the International System
Hot Hand
Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Power Politics and the Balance of Risk
The Prospects for Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory and International Relations
Policy bargaining and militarized conflict
Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states
The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions
Context, Methods, Numbers, And Words
Time to Fight
Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International Conflicts
Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992
Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises
Principal Rivalries
Shocks to the System
How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset
Alliances as a Necessary Condition of Multiparty Wars
Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads
Measuring Arms
Arms Versus Alliances
Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis
The Determinants of Uncertainty in International Relations
Revisiting Reputation
Dangerous Liaisons
Deterrence and International Conflict
Testing Nonnested Models of International Relations
War and Rivalry among Great Powers
The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries
How Initiators End Their Wars
Reputations and deterrence
David versus Goliath
Rivalries and the Democratic Peace in the Major Power Subsystem
Militarized territorial disputes
Midloc
International Systems, Domestic Structures, and Risk
The deterrent effects of economic integration
Crime and Punishment
The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985
Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes
An encyclopedia of world history, ancient, medieval, and modern, chronologically arranged.
The Origins of the Second World War 1933-1939
Controlling the Sword
European Historical Statistics 1750–1970
The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments
Prospect Theory
Conventional Deterrence
The Illusion of Peace
The Origins of Alliances
The Illusion of Peace
Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies
The Logic of Collective Action
The Logic of Collective Action
Polarity and stability
The Long Peace
Back to the Future
The Diplomacy Of Imperialism, 1890–1902
The Illusion of Peace
A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna
Changing Aspirations, Limited Attention, and War
Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
Internal and External Conflict
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
Alliance Formation and War Behavior
Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation
Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War
Measuring Systemic Polarity
Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816-1975
Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare
A Twist of Truth
The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons
When Will They Ever Learn
The War Proneness of Alliances
Terror without Deterrence
Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance
Power Transitions as a Cause of War
Power, Uncertainty, and the Onset of International Violence
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
British Hegemony and Major Power War, 1815-1939
Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict
Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War
On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes
The Relationship Between Size and Stability in the Major Power International System
Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability
Domestic Politics and War
Formal Alliances, 1816-1965
Formal alliances, 1815-1939
Bipolarity and War
Nuclear Myths and Political Realities
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice
The War Trap Revisited
War and the Cycle of Relative Power
Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965
Arms Races to War
| Unique citing works | 83 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,44 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2026 (35) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 83 |